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Uncorporate Insider Trading  
Peter Molk† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Federal securities law has long restricted company insiders 
from trading on the informational advantages they enjoy. This 
prohibition serves a variety of purposes. Some justify it as pro-
tecting the capital markets, safeguarding ordinary investors and 
their companies from opportunism.1 Others characterize insider 
trading restrictions as preventing the “inherent unfairness” that 
would result from insiders systematically trading with superior 
information.2 Still others focus on preventing share price distor-
tions that could arise from legalized insider trading.3 
For these goals to be realized and for insider trading liability 
to attach, fiduciary duties are required between either insiders 
and their trading partners or between insiders and their pro-
vider of information. The Supreme Court prominently and unan-
imously reiterated this requirement just under four years ago in 
Salman v. United States, affirming a conviction based in part on 
disclosing information in violation of fiduciary duties owed to the 
source.4  
 
†  Associate Professor, University of Florida Levin College of Law. Thanks 
to Stu Cohn, Jill Fisch, Scott Hirst, J. Travis Laster, Grayson McCouch, Lars 
Noah, Jim Park, Rob Rhee, Danny Sokol, Mark Weidemaier, Ron Wright, and 
participants at the Corporate and Securities Litigation workshop, Southeast 
Junior/Senior workshop, and University of Florida workshops for helpful com-
ments and suggestions. Copyright © 2020 by Peter Molk. 
 1. See, e.g., 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, 
ENFORCEMENT & PREVENTION §§ 1:3–4 (2019) (citing scholarship that looks at 
the effect of insider trading on non-inside traders). 
 2. Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Un-
der the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 355 (1979). 
 3. E.g., LANGEVOORT, supra note 1, § 1:5 (discussing the effect of delayed 
disclosures on market prices). 
 4. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 424 (2016). 
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Although a breached fiduciary duty has been a remarkably 
stable requirement of insider trading law,5 the state of business 
law fiduciary duties has recently undergone seismic change. His-
torically, and through most of insider trading law’s substantive 
development, most businesses were structured as corporations 
and general partnerships.6 In these business forms, company in-
siders owe mandatory fiduciary duties of at least loyalty and care 
to their companies and owners.7 This existence of mandatory fi-
duciary duties made it comparatively easy, across a broad range 
of insider activity, to satisfy insider trading liability’s require-
ment that fiduciary duties be breached. 
However, the last twenty years have seen a shift away from 
corporations and general partnerships as means of conducting 
business. New types of entities, especially limited liability com-
panies (LLCs) and, to a lesser extent, limited partnerships (LPs), 
have emerged as the entities of choice.8 Sometimes referred to as 
“uncorporate” entities,9 to highlight their difference from tradi-
tional corporations, these alternative entities now dwarf the rate 
of new corporate formations.10 
 
 5. The fiduciary duty requirement was first recognized by the Supreme 
Court in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980). The requirement 
of a special relationship was recognized even earlier, in 1909, although it was 
not formalized to a fiduciary duty breach until 1980. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 
419, 431 (1909). 
 6. Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An Empirical 
Study of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United 
States Between 2004–2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002–2006, 
15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 465 (2010). 
 7. See, e.g., Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996) (noting cor-
porations have governance flexibility subject to honoring judicial principles of 
fiduciary duty); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103(c)(i), (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997) 
(allowing partnerships to reduce the duty of loyalty if not manifestly unreason-
able and to reduce but not eliminate the duty of care); Mohsen Manesh, Con-
tractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law: Evidence from Pub-
licly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 560–62 (2012) (contrasting 
corporations’ mandatory fiduciary duties with rules of modern uncorporate en-
tities). Corporations also subject managers and officers to a mandatory fiduciary 
duty of good faith, which is generally categorized as a specific species of the duty 
of loyalty. See, e.g., Julian Velasco, The Diminishing Duty of Loyalty, 75 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1035, 1036–37 (2018).  
 8. Chrisman, supra note 6, at 460. 
 9. The term “uncorporations” was developed by Larry Ribstein. LARRY E. 
RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2010). 
 10. See, e.g., Chrisman, supra note 6, at 460 (estimating LLC formations 
outpace corporate formations by a two to one ratio).  
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The law often grants these alternative entities, unlike their 
corporate and general partnership counterparts, wide latitude in 
their contractual ability to modify or eliminate entirely the man-
datory fiduciary duties traditionally owed by company insiders. 
For example, Delaware, the leader in new LLC formations,11 ex-
pressly provides that “to the extent that, at law or in equity, a 
member or manager or other person . . . has duties (including fi-
duciary duties) to [the LLC or its owners, those] duties may be 
expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in [an LLC] 
agreement.”12 Similar accommodations are made for Delaware 
LPs.13 
States’ permissive attitudes toward alternative entities 
have generated a host of concerns,14 but until now none has fo-
cused on the implications for insider trading liability. When core 
insider trading restrictions rest on the existence of fiduciary du-
ties, that liability seemingly evaporates when those fiduciary du-
ties have been eliminated. Company insiders could trade on 
 
 11. See CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW ¶ 14.01[2] (Warren Gorham & Lamont/RIA 
1994 & Supp. 2007-2) (describing the “almost gravitational pull” of Delaware’s 
LLC law); Jens Dammann & Matthias Schündeln, Where Are Limited Liability 
Companies Formed? An Empirical Analysis, 55 J.L. & ECON. 741, 743 (2012) 
(finding large LLCs generally choose Delaware when forming outside their 
home state). 
 12. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2013). 
 13. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2010); Manesh, supra note 7, at 
561. 
 14. Scholars have generally examined whether governance flexibility is 
used to enhance entity efficiency or instead to expropriate welfare from owners. 
See, e.g., RIBSTEIN, supra note 9 (arguing for the general efficiency of alternative 
entity contractual freedom); Daniel S. Kleinberger, Two Decades of “Alternative 
Entities”: From Rationalization Through Alphabet Soup to Contract as Deity, 14 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 445, 458–59 (2009) (arguing that unfettered gov-
ernance flexibility will unduly disadvantage minority owners); Benjamin 
Means, Contractual Freedom and Family Business, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZA-
TIONS (Robert Hillman & Mark Loewenstein eds., 2015) (analyzing the particu-
lar case of family businesses); Manesh, supra note 7, at 558; Sandra K. Miller, 
The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with the Need for Man-
datory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1609, 1612 (2004) (arguing the same as Kleinberger); Peter Molk, 
How Do LLC Owners Contract Around Default Statutory Protections?, 42 J. 
CORP. L. 503, 505 (2017); Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. 
L. REV. 899, 900 (2011) (arguing the same as RIBSTEIN); Myron T. Steele, Free-
dom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in Delaware Limited Partner-
ships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221, 224 (2009) (same). 
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material, nonpublic information with impunity15 and pass (or 
sell) that information to others to do the same. Prosecution arse-
nals against insider trading would not only be severely depleted, 
but also the public policy concerns that have long supported in-
sider trading liability would go unrealized with these new uncor-
porate entities. Rank and file employees would continue to face 
restrictions, resulting in executives’, but not low-level employ-
ees’, being free to engage in insider trading.16 
This problem is not confined solely to privately held compa-
nies, which LLCs dominate. LLCs span both privately held and 
publicly traded companies.17 Moreover, insider trading re-
strictions, and the threat of SEC and private enforcement, apply 
equally to privately held and publicly traded companies.18 The 
potential to eliminate this liability through fiduciary duty waiv-
ers requires careful analysis. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I traces the history 
of insider trading law’s development. It highlights how, from its 
inception, the law reflects a focus on insiders’ fiduciary duties to 
either their companies or their shareholders to find liability. The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to find liability when 
these duties are not present, and it has also refused to extend 
restrictions outside the realm of fiduciary duties. In other words, 
 
 15. Of course, there may be non-legal reasons for insiders to obey insider 
trading restrictions, such as the desire to preserve one’s reputation or to con-
form with social pressure. See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Share-
holder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1951, 2006–07 (2018) (casting shareholder 
primacy as an institutionalized, although non-legal, obligation of management). 
 16. See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 18. SEC Litigation Release No. 22187, Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion v. Stiefel Laboratories Inc. and Charles W. Stiefel, Dec. 12, 2011, https:// 
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr22187.htm (alleging insider trading 
by CEO of private company that bought back shares at allegedly undervalued 
prices). See generally WINSTON & STRAWN LLP, SEC Renews Focus on Insider 
Trading in Private Company Stock (2011) (noting that the Stiefel case “empha-
sizes that the SEC will prosecute cases involving private companies”); SEC 
Press Release (Dec. 12, 2011) (SEC director noted that “[p]rivate companies and 
their officers must understand that they are not immune from the federal secu-
rities laws”). Private insider trading actions in privately held companies are also 
commonly brought as business opportunity claims. See, e.g., Pappas v. Tzolis, 
2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 08053 (Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2012). For a recent example involv-
ing such a claim, see Colorado Boxed Beef Co., Inc. v. Evanston Insurance Co., 
No. 8:18-cv-1237-T-02JSS, 2019 WL 77376 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 2, 2019). 
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fiduciary duties are an essential and necessary component of tra-
ditional insider trading liability. 
In light of this focus on fiduciary duties, Part II introduces 
the problem posed by the modern development of organizational 
alternatives to general partnerships and corporations. Recent 
years have seen an explosion in the popularity of LLCs and LPs, 
and state statutes often authorize complete waiver of fiduciary 
duties for these entities in ways never allowed for corporations 
or general partnerships. Wielding this freedom, companies de-
void of fiduciary duties, both publicly traded and privately held, 
have begun competing with corporate counterparts for invest-
ment dollars without offering the protection of insider trading 
prohibitions. 
Part III then addresses the resultant public policy concerns 
raised when insider trading liability vanishes. It surveys argu-
ments for and against insider trading liability and concludes 
that, in many respects, alternative entities present a similar 
case for proscribing insider trading as do corporations and gen-
eral partnerships. Indeed, some alternative entities are practi-
cally indistinguishable from their corporate and partnership 
counterparts, suggesting a need for similar treatment of insider 
trading liability. In other words, unless regulators have decided 
to do away with insider trading liability altogether—and there 
is little reason to think they have—as a policy matter at least 
some alternative organizations should be prohibited from elimi-
nating insider trading liability through wholesale fiduciary duty 
waivers. 
On the other hand, there are material differences between 
LLCs and LPs versus corporations and general partnerships. Al-
ternative entities are attractive to highly sophisticated investors 
because of their unparalleled latitude to craft individualized gov-
ernance provisions. Insider trading restrictions may be less 
needed and, indeed, harmful in these circumstances. Tailoring 
insider trading law to reflect alternative entity differences could 
still allow insider trading law to achieve its public policy goals, 
while at the same time allowing certain uncorporate entities to 
craft maximally efficient governance relationships. 
Part IV therefore considers ways to reintroduce insider trad-
ing liability to alternative entities. The solution requiring the 
least change would be to use alternative entities’ existing sole 
mandatory protection of the implied obligation of good faith and 
fair dealing to support insider trading liability. This route, how-
ever, provides only a very weak means to police insider trading; 
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among other disadvantages, it would seemingly preclude SEC 
enforcement.  
Part IV ultimately concludes that the most direct and effec-
tive solution would be to mandate, for at least some alternative 
entities, a fiduciary duty for management upon which insider 
trading liability could be premised. There are several options 
when doing so. This duty could stem from the duty of loyalty, or 
it could be a new duty based on existing fiduciary relationships 
to accomplish insider trading’s policy goals. States could accom-
plish this solution by reforming their state organizational law 
statutes, or the duty could be imposed through adventurous fed-
eral common law rulemaking. It could apply on a mandatory ba-
sis to all alternative entities, or only those that would most ben-
efit from insider trading restrictions. 
I.  INSIDER TRADING LAW   
Regulation of insider trading—trading in securities using 
material, nonpublic information—has a history dating back to 
the early 1900s. I focus first on the original “classical” theory of 
insider trading prohibitions, the source through which core com-
pany management is limited from trading in their own com-
pany’s securities. As we will see, the classical theory focuses on 
the fiduciary relationship among insiders, the firm, and its 
shareholders. Next I turn to the more recent “misappropriation” 
theory, where liability also hinges on a fiduciary duty of loyalty 
between the trader and her information source. Because both 
theories are based on the existence of managerial fiduciary du-
ties, both are affected by new uncorporate entities that allow 
elimination of these duties.19 
A. THE CLASSICAL THEORY 
Federal regulation of classical insider trading began with 
the 1909 United States Supreme Court opinion of Strong v. 
Repide.20 Recognizing insider trading as a species of fraud, the 
 
 19. SEC Rule 14e-3 is another potential source of liability that applies to 
trades by insiders or others in the context of an impending tender offer. 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2020). Because the Rule does not require the existence of a 
fiduciary duty, it proscribes insider trading in the limited tender offer context 
for all companies, even alternative entities that have waived fiduciary duties. 
But because its scope is only the takeover context, its prohibition on general 
insider trading by core insiders is limited. 
 20. 213 U.S. 419 (1909). Prior to this point, state and federal courts gener-
ally did not hold insiders accountable for trades in their private capacity. See, 
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court developed a “special facts” doctrine.21 According to the 
Court, special circumstances could create a fiduciary duty be-
tween an insider and her trading partner that required the in-
sider to disclose private information to her partner before trad-
ing.22 The Court concluded these special facts were satisfied, and 
a fiduciary duty arose, where a director, in a face-to-face trans-
action, concealed his identity from his trading partner and did 
not reveal his knowledge that the company’s stock was about to 
increase.23 The director’s failure to reveal this information to his 
trading partner before buying shares breached this fiduciary 
duty and constituted actionable fraudulent concealment.24 
While the precise contours of the “special facts” necessary to 
invoke liability were not laid out in the opinion, insider trading’s 
reliance on breached fiduciary duties was made clear.25 Conced-
ing for argument’s sake that “the ordinary relations between di-
rectors and shareholders in a business corporation are not of 
such a fiduciary nature as to make it the duty of a director to 
disclose [inside information],” the Court used its “special facts” 
inquiry to identify the “cases where, by reason of the special 
facts, such duty exists.”26 Later summarizing Strong ’s holding in 
1939, the Court noted that it is “clear that breach of that [in-
sider’s] fiduciary duty” was one of the key components to estab-
lishing insider trading liability.27  
The next major development in insider trading law’s land-
scape came in 1934 with Congress’s passage of the Securities and 
Exchange Act. Passed in response to a spectacular stock market 
 
e.g., HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 1 (1966) 
(“Prior to the year 1910 no one had ever publicly questioned the morality of 
officers, directors, and employees trading in the shares of corporations.”); H.L. 
Wilgus, Purchase of Shares of a Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder, 
8 MICH. L. REV. 267, 267 (1910). This did not stop isolated attempts to hold par-
ties liable for insider trading in state court. See, e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 
232 (Ga. 1903); Stewart v. Harris, 77 P. 277 (Kan. 1904). State law still gener-
ally refuses to recognize insider trading liability, at least when that trading oc-
curs over impersonal securities exchanges. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, In-
corporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading 
Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1222 (1995). 
 21. Repide, 213 U.S. at 431. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 431–34. 
 24. Id. at 432–33.  
 25. Id. at 431–34. 
 26. Id. at 431. 
 27. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 n.15 (1939). 
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boom, crash, and the Great Depression, the Act aimed to curb 
various types of securities manipulation and speculation.28 Sec-
tion 10(b)29 and SEC Rule 10b-530 provided a catch-all antifraud 
provision, capturing knowing misconduct that deceived inves-
tors.31 In doing so, Congress established the statutory source for 
federal insider trading liability begun in 1909’s Strong opinion. 
By failing to disclose material, nonpublic information to a trad-
ing partner when faced with a fiduciary duty to disclose that in-
formation (such as arising in Strong’s “special facts”), company 
insiders engage in fraudulent concealment of that information 
that trigger’s liability under Section 10(b).32 In essence, then, 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 served as the statutory means to 
continue what Strong had already declared unlawful: fraudulent 
concealment of material nonpublic information by core company 
insiders. 
Beginning in Strong and continuing in its statutory embod-
iment, classical insider trading liability is a theory founded in 
fraud.33 Liability requires the insider first to possess a duty to 
disclose her information that she breaches by trading without 
disclosure. Without a duty to disclose, the insider’s nondisclosure 
cannot constitute fraud.  
Subsequent cases thus focused on figuring out when an in-
sider possessed such a disclosure duty with her trading partner. 
The main source of this duty was the fiduciary relationship that 
insiders occupied relative to their companies and their trading 
partners. The classic Supreme Court cases of Chiarella v. United 
States34 and Dirks v. SEC35 emphasized the point. In Chiarella, 
the petitioner was employed by a financial printer that, among 
other things, printed materials distributed as part of corporate 
 
 28. See, e.g., Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 409 (1990) (analyzing the purpose 
of the Act). 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018). 
 30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020). 
 31. See, e.g., Thel, supra note 28, at 386–87 (describing this catch-all na-
ture). 
 32. See, e.g., LANGEVOORT, supra note 1, § 1:8 (explaining fraudulent con-
cealment of information). 
 33. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 247–48 (1980) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (focusing on common law fraud in considering clas-
sical insider trading liability). 
 34. Id. at 222 (majority opinion). 
 35. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
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takeovers.36 By virtue of his position, Chiarella identified five 
impending mergers before their public announcement, bought 
stock in the target companies based on this material nonpublic 
information, and realized gains of approximately $30,000 over 
the course of a year.37 After entering into a consent decree with 
the SEC, Chiarella was then prosecuted by the Department of 
Justice for violating Rule 10b-5’s antifraud prohibition.38  
In overturning his convictions, the Supreme Court summa-
rized insider trading liability as being premised upon failure to 
disclose information “that the other party is entitled to know be-
cause of a fiduciary or similar relation of trust and confidence 
between them.”39 Chiarella, however, had no relationship with 
any of his trading partners: he was not a core insider of the tar-
get companies and had no particular relationship with any of his 
open market trading partners that might establish the requisite 
fiduciary duty.40 Since Chiarella had no fiduciary duty that 
would give him an obligation to disclose information before trad-
ing, his nondisclosure could not constitute securities fraud, mak-
ing him not liable for his trades despite his use of material non-
public information.41 
Dirks v. SEC followed closely on the heels of Chiarella and 
likewise stressed the importance of a fiduciary duty breach be-
fore insider trading liability would be imposed. Dirks, a financial 
 
 36. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 228; cf. id. at 228 n.10 (reiterating the importance of fiduciary 
duties dating back to the Strong opinion of 1909); id. at 239 (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (“[N]o violation of § 10(b) could be made out absent a breach of some 
duty arising out a fiduciary relationship between buyer and seller.”); id. at 246 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (highlighting the majority’s “requirement of a ‘spe-
cial relationship’ akin to fiduciary duty before the statute gives rise to a duty to 
disclose or to abstain from trading upon material, nonpublic information”). See 
generally Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 1194 (summarizing Chiarella and Dirks 
as “ma[king] clear that liability could be imposed only if the defendant was sub-
ject to a duty to disclose prior to trading” and that “a duty to disclose only arose 
where the inside traders breached a pre-existing fiduciary duty owed to the per-
son with whom they traded”). Although the language might suggest a difference 
between fiduciary duty and relationships of trust and confidence, the two have 
been read to be functionally equivalent. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 
947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (“A ‘similar relationship of trust and confi-
dence,’ therefore, must be the functional equivalent of a fiduciary relation-
ship.”). 
 40. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232–33. 
 41. Id. at 232. 
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analyst, received material, nonpublic information from Secrist, 
a former insurance company officer, that the insurer’s shares 
were dramatically inflated due to company fraud.42 Dirks inves-
tigated the claims and discussed his findings with some of his 
firm’s clients, some of whom sold their holdings as a result. Alt-
hough Dirks and his company never traded in the insurer’s 
shares, the SEC nevertheless censured him for aiding and abet-
ting securities fraud in passing inside information to his firm’s 
clients, which Dirks appealed.43 
Just as in Chiarella, the Supreme Court focused in Dirks on 
whether Dirks possessed a fiduciary duty that he breached by 
passing information to his firm’s clients. The Court first noted 
that Dirks “was a stranger to [the insurer], with no pre-existing 
fiduciary duty to its shareholders.”44 Traditional insider trading 
restrictions therefore did not immediately apply to him, as he 
owed no fiduciary duty to the company or the information’s 
source.45 And, since neither he nor his clients owed duties to the 
insurer’s shareholders, the trades did not breach any fiduciary 
duties.46  
However, even though Dirks was not a company insider and 
therefore owed no traditional fiduciary duties to the company or 
its shareholders, as a “tippee” of Secrist, a company insider, he 
could nevertheless be liable as “a participant after the fact in 
[an] insider’s breach of a fiduciary duty,” effectively inheriting 
Secrist’s disclosure duties.47 The Court held that for tippee lia-
bility to result, the first step is to “determine whether the in-
sider’s ‘tip’ constituted a breach of the insider’s fiduciary duty,” 
which occurs when the tipper insider benefits directly or indi-
rectly from the tip.48 The Court also noted that “[t]he elements 
of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also 
exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential infor-
mation . . . .”49 In addition to the tipper’s breach of fiduciary 
duty, the tippee must also “know[] or should know that there 
has been a breach” of the tipper’s fiduciary duty when the tippee 
 
 42. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 648–49 (1983). 
 43. Id. at 648–52. 
 44. Id. at 665. 
 45. Id. at 665–67. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 667 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 
(1980)).  
 48. Id. at 661. 
 49. Id. at 664. 
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receives the tip.50 Without a fiduciary duty breach by the tipper 
and the tippee’s knowledge of that breach, the tippee does not 
inherit the tipper’s disclosure duty, rendering her free to use the 
information without facing insider trading liability. As the Court 
summarized, “a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the share-
holders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic infor-
mation only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to 
the shareholders . . . .”51 Because Dirks’s inside source Secrist 
wanted to expose fraud, and was not seeking any direct or indi-
rect personal benefit, Secrist breached no duty in giving the in-
formation to Dirks, so Dirks inherited none of Secrist’s fiduciary 
duties.52 Dirks, therefore, could use the material nonpublic in-
formation however he wished, including passing it to clients to 
trade. 
Since its establishment, the requisite fiduciary duty breach 
has remained firmly entrenched in classical Supreme Court in-
sider trading jurisprudence.53 Just recently in 2016, the Court 
faced another tippee liability case in Salman v. United States.54 
Finding the tippee liable, the Court reiterated its prior holdings 
that “a tippee is exposed to liability for trading on inside infor-
mation only if the tippee participates in a breach of the tipper’s 
fiduciary duty.”55 In that case, the Court held Salman to have 
inherited his insider brother-in-law’s fiduciary duty when the 
brother-in-law gave tips as a gift; Salman breached the duty by 
making $1.5 million in profits for his own account without first 
disclosing the information.56 Without a breach of the brother-in-
law’s fiduciary duty, however, no derivative liability could have 
resulted.57 
The Supreme Court has not been explicit about the particu-
lar fiduciary duty that is necessary for classical insider trading 
liability to result. However, defining fiduciary duties has long 
 
 50. Id. at 660. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 667. 
 53. See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and 
Justice Powell’s Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 18–
28 (1998) (tracing the history of insider trading law’s requisite fiduciary duty 
breach). 
 54. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
 55. Id. at 427. 
 56. Id. at 423–24. 
 57. See id. at 427–28 (premising liability on brother’s fiduciary duty 
breach). 
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been within the purview of state law, and the general58 consen-
sus is that this duty arises from state law, not federal. Circuit 
courts, for example, have echoed this focus on linking insider 
trading liability to state fiduciary duties. The Fourth Circuit has 
noted that “the federal securities laws are not the source of such 
a duty [to disclose or face insider trading] . . . . Rather, the duty 
to disclose . . . arises only where there is some basis outside the 
securities laws, such as state law . . . .”59 The Sixth Circuit has 
held that “[b]ecause the ‘fiduciary duty’ [requisite for insider 
trading liability] is not defined under § 10(b) itself, courts have 
incorporated state law definitions of fiduciary duty.”60 The Sev-
enth Circuit has similarly held that “[t]he obligation to break si-
lence [or face insider trading liability] is itself based on state law, 
and so may be redefined to the extent state law permits.”61 Many 
district courts have similarly followed suit.62 
Academics have similarly turned to state law as the source 
of insider trading liability’s fiduciary duty. For example, in sum-
marizing the state of insider trading liability in 1982, Donald 
Langevoort noted that  
The insiders who will always have such an obligation [to refrain from 
insider trading] are corporate directors, officers, and employees. Each 
of these acts in an agency (or quasi-agency) capacity . . . . Hence, such 
a person owes fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to the corporation 
and derivatively to its shareholders. As a result, most of the pre-Chi-
arella cases brought under rule 10b-5 are not subject to question.63 
 
 58. This is not the exclusive consensus, however. Recently the Second Cir-
cuit bucked this consensus by holding that the fiduciary duty arises from federal 
common law. Steginsky v. Xcelera, Inc., 741 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 2014). I discuss 
this development infra in Part IV. 
 59. Fortson v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, 961 F.2d 469, 472 
(4th Cir. 1992). 
 60. Nolfi v. Ohio Ky. Oil Corp., 675 F.3d 538, 549 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 61. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1987) (inter-
nal citations omitted). 
 62. For example, in SEC v. Obus, the Southern District of New York noted 
that “[i]n the wake of Chiarella and its progeny, courts have consulted state law 
to identify a duty adequate to support insider trading liability. . . . While the 
SEC may promulgate a rule that imposes such a duty, provided the rule con-
forms to the rulemaking powers conferred to it by Congress, the SEC, has not 
requested statutory clarification of the duty necessary to impose insider trading 
liability.” No. 06 CIV 3150 GBD, 2010 WL 3703846, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 
2010). 
 63. Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A 
Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 20 (1982). 
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More recently, Richard Epstein identified the classical in-
sider trading theory’s problems from “not tak[ing] into account 
the notion that the fiduciary duties in question sound in con-
tract, not in regulatory fiat.”64 He goes on to argue that we 
should “treat the law of fiduciary duties as the baseline for Rule 
10b-5. The hard question here is whether the breach of these 
contractual duties of loyalty should be regarded as serious 
enough to merit criminal prosecution.”65 This focus on state law 
fiduciary duties, often the duty of loyalty, as the source for in-
sider trading’s fiduciary duty is common.66 
 B. THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY 
The misappropriation theory was developed well after the 
classical theory was established. Unlike the classical theory, the 
misappropriation theory applies to “outsiders”: traders in com-
pany stock who owe no traditional fiduciary duties to that com-
pany or its investors.67 The theory was adopted by the Supreme 
 
 64. Richard A. Epstein, Returning to Common-Law Principles of Insider 
Trading After United States v. Newman, 125 YALE L.J. 1482, 1496 (2016). 
 65 Id. at 1502. 
 66. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Joe Bankman, Substitutes for Insider Trading, 54 
STAN. L. REV. 235, 253 (2001) (noting that “a director of Intel could use [material 
nonpublic information about Intel] to trade in Compaq stock. The director of 
Intel is not a fiduciary of Compaq and so owes no duty of loyalty to Compaq 
shareholders.”); Sarah Baumgartel, Privileging Professional Insider Trading, 
51 GA. L. REV. 71, 72 (2016) (“[M]odern insider trading enforcement is premised 
on the idea that personal relationships, such as friendship, can give rise to le-
gally-enforceable duties of loyalty and confidentiality.”); Sung Hui Kim, Insider 
Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928, 940–41 (2014) (arguing 
that in Dirks the Supreme Court “silently substituted the insider’s duty of dis-
closure owed to the shareholders . . . with the insider-tipper’s breach of his duty 
of loyalty and confidentiality. . . .”); Michael R. Siebecker, Political Insider 
Trading, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2717, 2740 (2017) (“It is precisely because silence 
would constitute a breach of a fiduciary duty of loyalty that the Supreme Court 
imposes upon insiders a special disclosure duty prior to trading.”). 
 67. Zachary Gubler has proposed that the misappropriation theory also be 
applied to classical insiders, entirely displacing the classical theory because of 
the misappropriation theory’s ability to unify insider trading liability under a 
single, intuitive approach. Zachary J. Gubler, A Unified Theory of Insider Trad-
ing Law, 105 GEO. L.J. 1225 (2017). Donna Nagy also recently argued that the 
misappropriation theory should be extended to classical insider trading cases. 
Donna M. Nagy, Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 J. 
CORP. L. 1 (2016) (proposing that insider trading restrictions be broadened to 
include “fraud on contemporaneous traders.”); Donna M. Nagy, Salman v. 
United States: Insider Trading’s Tipping Point?, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 28 
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Court in 1997 in United States v. O’Hagan.68 Liability attaches 
to outsiders who trade on information when those outsiders have 
a duty to keep that information confidential.69 The trader’s “mis-
appropriation” of confidential information for personal gain 
while, at the same time, feigning loyalty to the information’s 
source constitutes fraud under Section 10(b).70  
While the misappropriation theory applies to outsiders trad-
ing in another company’s stock, the trader’s information source 
can be the employer with respect to which they are an insider. 
Suppose the CEO of a technology company knows of a nonpublic 
impending product release that will take significant market 
share from competitors. News of the release will increase her 
company’s share price and reduce competitors’. The classical the-
ory prohibits the CEO from trading in her company stock with-
out first disclosing the nonpublic information; as an insider of 
the company, she owes fiduciary duties to the company and her 
trading partners that are breached when she trades. With re-
spect to competitors, though, the CEO is an outsider; she owes 
no fiduciary duties to competing companies or their sharehold-
ers, so the traditional theory would not keep her from shorting 
competitors’ stock.  
These trades, however, would fall within the scope of the 
misappropriation theory. By secretly misappropriating infor-
mation for her personal use, the CEO violates the fiduciary duty 
of loyalty she owes to her company and shareholders, even 
though she ultimately trades with parties to whom she owes no 
duties.71 So even though the misappropriation theory applies for-
mally to “outsiders,” it is highly relevant to determining the 
scope of core insiders’ trading restrictions. 
The misappropriation theory requires three conditions to be 
satisfied for it to apply to trading on nonpublic information.72 




 68. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997). The theory had 
been accepted by some lower courts several years prior to its Supreme Court 
acceptance. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 239–45 (1980) (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting) (summarizing misappropriation theory but noting that it had 
not been presented to the jury). 
 69. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53. 
 70. Id. at 653–54.  
 71. Id. at 652. 
 72. See Gubler, supra note 67, at 1255 (collapsing these three elements into 
two). 
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of trust and confidence, to her information’s source.73 These du-
ties typically come from the agency relationship between the 
agent-trader and the principal-source, as with a CEO and her 
employing firm/shareholders, but they can also arise by agree-
ment74 or strong circumstances indicating their presence.75 Sec-
ond, the trader must be required not to trade on the information, 
often by keeping the information confidential.76 Third, the trader 
must not inform her source that she will use information for per-
sonal gain prior to her trade, to preserve the fraud element of 
“feigning loyalty.”77 If all three elements are satisfied, misappro-
priation theory does not attach to the trades. 
Like the classical theory, then, misappropriation theory lia-
bility relies on the presence of fiduciary duties. Unlike the clas-
sical theory, the misappropriation theory is explicit about the 
duty at issue—state law—based on a fiduciary duty of loyalty to 
the information source.78 Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted 
that, while full disclosure of one’s trading plans negates the “de-
ception” element of securities fraud, “the fiduciary-turned-trader 
may remain liable under state law for breach of a duty of loy-
alty.”79 Without this fiduciary duty, misappropriation theory li-
ability collapses. 
 C. SATISFYING THE FIDUCIARY DUTY REQUIREMENT 
Throughout insider trading law’s development, the require-
ment for a trader to owe fiduciary duties has been constant. Un-
der the classical insider trading theory, the insider must breach 
a fiduciary duty owed to her trading partners before insider trad-
ing liability can be imposed, with the source of this duty typically 
 
 73. One could argue that misappropriation theory actually rests more 
squarely on the business opportunity doctrine, which is a particular subset of 
the duty of loyalty. Although the distinction does not matter when the entire 
duty of loyalty has been waived, it could be important when entities waive only 
the business opportunity doctrine but not the broader duty of loyalty. Gabriel 
Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An 
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 
1075, 1143–44 (2017); see, e.g. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 
1969) (alleged insider trading action couched as taking of a corporate oppor-
tunity). 
 74. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653–54. 
 75. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2018). 
 76. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. 
 77. Id. at 655.  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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state law fiduciary duties of loyalty.80 Under the misappropria-
tion theory, the insider must breach a fiduciary duty owed to her 
information, with the source of this fiduciary also being state 
law-based duties of loyalty. As summarized by Delaware Vice 
Chancellor Laster, 
Federal law does not give rise to or establish the fiduciary duties of 
directors or officers. Those matters are governed by state law. Thus the 
federal insider trading regime as currently structured rests on a foun-
dation of state law fiduciary duties. If Delaware were to hold that the 
fiduciary duties of directors and officers did not limit their insider trad-
ing, the cornerstone of the federal system would be removed.81 
Until relatively recently, meeting these fiduciary duty re-
quirements has been unproblematic for company executives 
trading on material information acquired in their executive ca-
pacity. Most businesses were organized as either corporations or 
as general partnerships, both of which have mandatory state law 
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care imposed on their manage-
ment.82 For example, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act 
(RUPA), adopted in thirty-nine states, requires mandatory fidu-
ciary duties of loyalty and of care of company management.83 
These fiduciary duties can be reduced, but not entirely elimi-
nated. The Model Business Corporation Act, which forms the ba-
sis of thirty-two states’ business corporation statutes, imposes 
on directors and officers mandatory fiduciary duties of care, loy-
alty, and good faith;84 adopting states have refused to allow cor-
porations to eliminate these fiduciary duties entirely.85 Dela-
ware, whose business law has been widely influential across the 
country, imposes RUPA-like duties of care and loyalty on part-
nerships, while allowing parties broad flexibility to waive liabil-
ity for fiduciary duty breaches, but not the fiduciary duties 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Pfeiffer v. Toll, 989 A.2d 683, 704 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 82. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 83. REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 409 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997). 
For a helpful and comprehensive summary of alternative entity fiduciary du-
ties, see Mohsen Manesh, Fiduciary Principles in Unincorporated Entity Law, 
in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW (2018). 
 84. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30, 8.42 (AMERICAN BAR ASS’N 2010); 2016 
REVISION TO MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT, (AMERICAN BAR ASS’N 2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/business_law/ 
corplaws/2016_mbca.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK7D-42VW]. 
 85. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting out of Fiduciary Du-
ties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 10 (1990) 
(“[M]odern corporate statutes . . . include many mandatory terms, including 
voting rules, fiduciary duties and legal capital rules.”). 
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themselves.86 Delaware corporate managers and officers are sub-
ject to mandatory fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and good faith, 
which can also be reduced but not wholly eliminated.87 Even Ne-
vada, widely recognized as the state with the least burdensome 
fiduciary duty requirements, imposes a mandatory fiduciary 
duty on corporate actors that prohibits intentional misconduct 
and knowing violations of the law, which presumably could be 
used for finding insider trading liability.88  
Because company management was historically subjected to 
mandatory state law fiduciary duties, the main issues in insider 
trading cases tended to be whether these duties had been 
breached89 or whether tippees had inherited the tipper’s pre-ex-
isting fiduciary,90 rather than the existence of a fiduciary duty 
by insiders in the first place. As long as the tipper was a core 
insider of the company—a director or officer—the tipper’s pos-
session of a fiduciary duty when trading in her company stock 
simply was not an issue; fairly uniform fiduciary duties were im-
posed by operation of mandatory state law. 
Recent developments have upended this insider trading 
framework. New uncorporate organizational forms, most promi-
nently LLCs and LPs, have arisen, and many states grant these 
alternative entities the power for complete elimination of core 
insiders’ state law fiduciary duties. Under these states’ laws, 
core insiders (but not rank and file employees)91 no longer face 
 
 86. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, §§ 15-103(f), 15-404. 
 87. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 122(17) (allowing waivers of specific corpo-
rate opportunities, but not wholesale corporate opportunity waivers); id. 
§ 102(b)(7) (not allowing exculpations of duty of loyalty or duty of good faith 
violations, but allowing exculpations of duty of care); Malpiede v. Townson, 780 
A.2d 1075, 1095 (Del. 2001) (explaining that exculpating duty of care still allows 
parties to seek non-financial relief and leaves the duty of care’s obligations in-
tact); Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996) (requiring corporate 
actors to comply with fiduciary duties). 
 88. Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liabil-
ity-Free Jurisdiction, 98 VA. L. REV. 935, 951–52 (2012). 
 89. See, e.g., Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 90. See, e.g., Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).  
 91. The governance agreement could, of course, eliminate fiduciary duties 
for employees as well as management, freeing employees from insider trading 
liability to the extent those duties exist. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY §§ 8.02–8.03 (AM. LAW. INST. 2006) (imposing duty of loyalty on com-
pany employees). Waivers, however, are typically written to focus on executives’ 
and officers’, and sometimes owners’, fiduciary duties, rarely addressing other 
employees. See, e.g., Manesh, supra note 7, at 575 (identifying fiduciary duty 
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mandatory fiduciary duties. The implications from this whole-
sale fiduciary duty elimination for insider trading law have gone 
unnoticed. But because breaching a fiduciary duty is a predicate 
element for imposing insider trading liability, when fiduciary 
duties disappear, so too does the apparent liability under exist-
ing legal theories. Alternative entities therefore raise the prob-
lematic potential for companies to operate without the threat of 
insider trading liability. The next Part begins to address this is-
sue by reviewing the law related to these new organizational 
forms. 
 II.  THE RISE OF DUTILESS ALTERNATIVES   
Although general partnerships and corporations dominated 
organizational law for many years, that is no longer the case. 
New uncorporate forms have gained significant traction in re-
cent years. In particular, LPs and especially LLCs have emerged 
as the preferred means for conducting business enterprise.92 
New LLC formations began to exceed new corporate formations 
beginning in 2004,93 and non-corporate alternatives have grown 
only more popular since then:94 existing Delaware LLCs and LPs 
now outnumber corporations by more than a three-to-one mar-
gin.95 
Alternative entities have been adopted by companies both 
large and small and both privately and publicly held. Prominent 
examples of privately-owned LLCs include the automobile 
maker Chrysler, the financial firm Fidelity Investments, and 
PJM Interconnection, which manages the electrical grid that 
reaches sixty-five million people in the United States.96 Publicly 
 
waiver language that addresses managerial but not lower level employee fidu-
ciary duties). 
 92. Daniel M. Häusermann, For a Few Dollars Less: Explaining State to 
State Variation in Limited Liability Company Popularity, 20 U. MIAMI BUS. L. 
REV. 1 (2011). 
 93. Id. at 6. 
 94. See, e.g., Chrisman, supra note 6, at 460 (showing that new LLC for-
mations were more than double new corporate formations). 
 95. Mohsen Manesh, Creatures of Contract: A Half-Truth about LLCs, 42 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 391, 393 n.5 (2018). The divergence continues to grow over time; 
2017 saw 143,996 new Delaware LLCs organized, compared to only 41,553 cor-
porations. Annual Report Statistics, DEL. DIV. OF CORPS., https://corp 
.delaware.gov/stats/ [https://perma.cc/E5TV-8AC8]. In the same year, 11,517 
combined LPs and limited liability partnerships were organized, but the num-
ber of LPs alone was not broken out. Id. 
 96. About Us, FCA, http://www.fcanorthamerica.com/company/AboutUs/ 
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traded LLCs span a variety of industries. TravelCenters of 
America is a publicly traded LLC that operates and franchises a 
series of interstate service centers across the country.97 MGM 
Growth Properties owns a series of recognizable real estate prop-
erties that include The Mirage, Mandalay Bay, the Monte Carlo 
Resort and Casino, and the Excalibur Hotel and Casino.98 Apollo 
Global Management, Fortress Investment, and Och-Ziff Capital 
Management are prominent publicly traded LLC investment 
firms.99 Bloomberg is perhaps the best known privately owned 
LP; it is the thirty-sixth largest private company measured by 
revenue.100 Publicly traded LPs are mainly found in the oil and 
gas and real estate management areas.101 For instance, Enter-
prise Products Partners, with a market capitalization of $63 bil-
lion, engages primarily in natural gas and crude oil processing 
and transportation.102 Publicly traded LPs also populate a hand-
ful of other industries. The Blackstone Group, for example, is a 
publicly traded investment management limited partnership 
with $450 billion of assets under management and a market cap-
italization of $44 billion.103  
LLCs and LPs have grown in popularity for two principal 
reasons. Some choose them for their relatively easy way of com-
bining limited liability protection with the favorable tax treat-
ment of partnerships.104 Others, however, use LLCs and LPs for 
 
Pages/AboutUs.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y59G-MKUB]; Our Heritage, FIDELITY, 
https://www.fidelity.com/about-fidelity/our-heritage https://perma.cc/WA5G 
-TKHF]; Who We Are, PJM, https://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/MA78-2G5P]. 
 97. TravelCenters of America – Investors, TRAVELCENTERS, http://investors 
.ta-petro.com/investors/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/5ADD-G2MV]. 
 98. MGM GROWTH PROPERTIES, ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2017). 
 99. Apollo Global Management LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (2018); 
Fortress Investment Group LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (2016); Och-Ziff 
Capital Management Group LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (2017). 
 100. America’s Largest Private Companies, FORBES; Bloomberg, BLOOM-
BERG FINANCE L.P., https://www.bloomberg.com/company/?utm_source= 
bloomberg-menu&utm_medium=blp [https://perma.cc/566P-QZF9]. 
 101. Lists of Current MLPs & MLP Funds, MASTER LIMITED P’SHIP ASS’N, 
https://www.mlpassociation.org/mlp-101/list-of-current-mlps/ [https://perma 
.cc/336Z-7NQK]. 
 102. About Us, ENTERPRISE PRODS. PARTNERS L.P., https://www 
.enterpriseproducts.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/DC75-BHJK]. 
 103. Who We Are, BLACKSTONE, https://www.blackstone.com/the-firm/ 
overview [https://perma.cc/TEQ5-42TZ]. 
 104. Molk, supra note 14, at 505. 
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the governance flexibility that they provide.105 Most states give 
LLCs and LPs more flexibility to set their internal governance 
relationships by contract than corporations or general partner-
ships, with few if any mandatory provisions imposed.106 Dela-
ware has emerged as the leader of this movement, designing its 
statutes to give “maximum effect to the principle of freedom of 
contract and to the enforceability of [companies’ governance pro-
visions].”107 For Delaware LLCs and LPs, only contract law’s im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing—which is not a fi-
duciary duty—is mandatory; other traditional protections from 
corporate and partnership law apply at most merely by de-
fault.108  
In particular, Delaware LLCs and LPs can, if they so desire, 
entirely eliminate any fiduciary or other duties that managers 
or officers would otherwise owe to the company or its owners.109 
These duties are mandatory for partnerships and corporations, 
but they apply merely by default to alternative entities. The LLC 
statute explicitly allows that: 
To the extent that, at law or in equity, a member or manager or other 
person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a[n LLC] or to another 
member . . . the member’s or manager’s or other person’s duties may 
be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the [LLC] 
agreement . . . .110 
Delaware’s LP statute provides functionally equivalent lan-
guage.111 Therefore, while traditional fiduciary duties upon 
which insider trading liability has rested are mandatory for 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. See, e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND 
KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, app. 9:6 (2016) (summarizing 
state LLC law provisions on fiduciary duty waivers). 
 107. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-1101(c) (LPs), 18-1101(b) (LLCs). 
 108. Id. § 17-1101(d) (LPs); id. § 18-1101(c) (LLCs). 
 109. Id. Delaware statutes purport to allow eliminating any duties owed ei-
ther at law or in equity, but some have questioned the constitutionality of lim-
iting equitable powers of Delaware’s Chancery Court. Lyman Johnson, Dela-
ware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 701 (2011). See generally Mohsen 
Manesh, Equity in LLC Law?, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 93, 106–17 (2016) (review-
ing this argument and relevant Delaware court development). In any event, 
Delaware courts have yet to raise this argument to limit fiduciary duty waivers, 
instead pointing to it only for waivers of the right to seek equitable judicial dis-
solution. In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 114 A.3d 592 (Del. Ch. 2015); Huatuco v. 
Satellite Healthcare & Satellite Dialysis of Tracy, LLC, C.A. No. 8465-VCG, 
2013 WL 6460898 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2013).  
 110. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c). 
 111. Id. § 17-1101(d). 
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corporations and general partnerships, they apply only by de-
fault to Delaware alternative entities. LLCs and LPs can en-
tirely eliminate those fiduciary duties by organizing in Delaware 
and adopting appropriate language in their governance docu-
ments. 
Delaware LLCs and LPs have not been shy about waiving 
fiduciary duties. In an empirical study of publicly traded Dela-
ware LLCs and LPs, Mohsen Manesh found that almost  
half—49%—waived all three fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and 
good faith.112 Other studies have shown that privately held al-
ternative entities evince similar fiduciary duty eliminations, alt-
hough at more modest rates.113 
Language from the publicly traded LLC MGM Growth Prop-
erties is illustrative. Its operating agreement provides: 
[T]o the fullest extent permitted by law, no [manager, managing mem-
ber, officer, director, agent, tax matters partner, fiduciary or trustee] 
shall have any duties or Liabilities, including any fiduciary duties, to 
the Company, any Member, any other Person who acquires an interest 
in a Share or any other Person who is bound by this Agreement. . . .114 
The agreement further provides that management of the com-
pany  
shall, to the fullest extent permitted by law, make [a] decision in its 
sole and absolute discretion . . . and shall be entitled to consider only 
such interests and factors as it desires, including its own interests, and 
shall have no duty or obligation (fiduciary or otherwise) to give any 
consideration to any interest of or factors affecting the Company or the 
Members. . . .115 
The agreement also provides for a complete waiver of the ana-
logue to the corporate opportunity doctrine, noting that no per-
son  
who acquires knowledge of a potential transaction, agreement, ar-
rangement or other matter that may be an opportunity for the 
 
 112. Manesh, supra note 7, at 575. 
 113. See, e.g., Suren Gomtsian, Contractual Mechanisms of Investor Protec-
tion in Non-Listed Limited Liability Companies, 60 VILL. L. REV. 955, 987, 991 
(2015) (finding elimination or modification of fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, 
and good faith in approximately one quarter of examined companies); Molk, su-
pra note 14, at 528 (showing waivers of fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and 
good faith in privately held LLCs are present, although uncommon). Fiduciary 
duties are not the sole standard business law protection that LLCs modify. For 
analysis of additional waivers, see Molk, supra note 14; Peter Molk & Verity 
Winship, LLCs and the Private Ordering of Dispute Resolution, 41 J. CORP. L. 
795 (2016). 
 114. Form of Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Agreement 
of MGM Growth Properties LLC, (Form 10-K, Ex. 3.1) §§ 1.1, 7.9(a) (2016). 
 115. Id. § 7.9(c). 
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Company, shall have any duty to communicate or offer such oppor-
tunity to the Company, and such [person] shall not be liable to [any 
LLC member] for breach of this Agreement or any duty otherwise ex-
isting at law, in equity or otherwise or obligation of any type whatso-
ever, by reason of the fact that such [person] pursues or acquires such 
opportunity for itself, directs such opportunity to another Person or 
does not communicate such opportunity or information to the Com-
pany.116 
MGM Growth Property LLC’s language is hardly unique; similar 
waiver language is not difficult to find among publicly traded 
LLCs and LPs.117 For example, the partnership agreement of 
CVR Partners, a publicly traded Delaware LP that operates a 
nitrogen fertilizer business, provides: 
Except as expressly set forth in this Agreement, neither the General 
Partners nor any other [person] shall have any duties or liabilities, in-
cluding fiduciary duties, to the Partnership or any Partner and the pro-
visions of this Agreement, to the extent that they restrict, eliminate or 
otherwise modify the duties and liabilities, including fiduciary duties, 
of the General Partner or any other [person] otherwise existing at law 
or in equity, are agreed by the Partners to replace such other duties 
and liabilities of the General Partner or such other [person].118 
Despite some seeming reluctance,119 Delaware courts en-
force these broad fiduciary duty waivers.120 For example, in 
 
 116. Id. § 7.5(b). 
 117. See, e.g., Manesh, supra note 7, at 757 (finding similar expansive lan-
guage used among the 49% of publicly traded uncorporate entities that waived 
traditional fiduciary duties). 
 118. Form of Second Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited Partner-
ship of CVR Partners, LP (Form S-1) § 7.9(e) (2008). This language is generally 
taken by Delaware courts to eliminate all default fiduciary duties. Lonergan v. 
EPE Holdings LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1017 (Del. Ch. 2010) (involving an LP agree-
ment with substantially identical language); In re Atlas Energy Res. LLC, No. 
4589, 2010 WL 4273122, at *12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010) (involving an LLC agree-
ment with nearly identical language). 
 119. See, e.g., In re Carlisle Etcetera, 114 A.3d 592 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015) 
(providing equitable judicial dissolution remedy in the face of an apparent con-
tradictory governance provision); Leo E. Strine, Jr. & J. Travis Laster, The Si-
ren Song of Unlimited Contractual Freedom, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PART-
NERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 11, 
25–26 (Robert W. Hillman & Mark J. Lowenstein eds., 2015) (“[C]ontractual 
liability standards have generated judicial decisions that leave investors with 
no remedy because of the court’s need to be faithful to the contract, even in cir-
cumstances when the court itself harbored serious doubt that the alternative 
entity had gotten a fair shake.”). 
 120. To further the Delaware statute’s commitment to contractual freedom, 
Delaware courts have enforced waivers of a variety of fundamental governance 
protections. See, e.g., Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286 (Del. 
1999) (enforcing Delaware LLC agreement requiring all disputes to be decided 
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Kahn v. Icahn, the Delaware Chancery Court enforced a broad 
business opportunity waiver in dismissing a complaint alleging 
investor-manager Carl Icahn took for himself profitable real es-
tate opportunities that were directly within the line of business 
of the LP he was managing.121 In Zimmerman v. Crothall, the 
Delaware Chancery Court enforced an LLC’s fiduciary duty of 
loyalty waiver that allowed managers to be on both sides of a 
challenged business transaction.122 And in In re Atlas Energy Re-
sources, the Delaware Chancery Court refused to allow claims to 
proceed against directors who approved a merger between their 
publicly traded LLC and its controlling shareholder at an alleg-
edly unfair price.123 The Court pointed to the LLC’s blanket 
waiver of fiduciary duties that precluded what might otherwise 
have been “a colorable claim for the breach of the traditional fi-
duciary duties of care and loyalty . . . .”124 
Enforcing these waivers is perhaps not surprising given the 
attitude that expressly appears in the Delaware LLC and LPs 
statutes: giving maximum effect to the principle of freedom of 
contract.125 As Chancellor Chandler has noted, “for a Delaware 
limited liability company, the contract’s the thing.”126 Similar 
sentiments have echoed throughout Delaware opinions.127 
 
by either arbitration or by California courts); In re Seneca Inv. LLC, 970 A.2d 
259 (Del. Ch. 2008) (allowing LLC to change line of business because operating 
agreement specified company could pursue “any lawful act”); R & R Capital, 
LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. C.A. 3803, 2008 WL 3846318 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008) (enforcing waiver of ability to seek judicial dissolution); 
Minnesota Invco of RSA No. 7 v. Midwest Wireless Holdings LLC, 903 A.2d 786 
(Del. Ch. 2006) (enforcing operating agreement’s amendment process that al-
lowed majority member to amend agreement unilaterally).;  
 121. Kahn v. Icahn, No. C.A. 15916, 1998 WL 832629 (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 
1998). 
 122. Zimmerman v. Crothall, 62 A.3d 676 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 123. In re Atlas Energy Resources, LLC, No. C.A. 4589, 2010 WL 4273122 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010). 
 124. Id. at *14; cf. Sonet v. Timber Co., L.P., 722 A.2d 319 (Del. Ch. 1998) 
(pointing to L.P. agreement’s waiver of fiduciary duties to dismiss claim alleging 
unfair merger terms). 
 125. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-1101(c) (LPs), 18-1101(b) (LLCs). 
 126. R & R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. C.A. 
308, 2008 WL 3846318, at *1 (Del Ch. Aug. 19, 2008). 
 127. See, e.g., Henson v. Sousa, No. C.A. 8057, 2015 WL 4640415, at *1 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 4, 2015) (“LLCs, as this Court has repeatedly pointed out, are creatures 
of contract.”); Touch of It. Salumeria & Pasticceria, LLC v. Bascio, No. C.A. 
8602, 2014 WL 108895, at *4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2014) (“[R]ecognizing that LLCs 
are creatures of contract, I must enforce LLC agreements as written.”); Costan-
tini v. Swiss Farm Stores Acquisition LLC, No. C.A. 8613, 2013 WL 4758228, at 
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Of course, Delaware is not the sole state for LLC and LP 
formations. Nevertheless, highlighting Delaware’s stance on fi-
duciary duty waivers is important for two reasons. First, Dela-
ware has leapt to the fore in attracting unincorporated business 
entities, leading all other states in out-of-state formations. Em-
pirical studies confirm that when large128 or small129 privately 
held alternative entities choose to locate outside their home 
state, they most often choose Delaware. Publicly traded alterna-
tive entities show an overwhelming Delaware preference.130  
Second, Delaware law exerts an “almost gravitational pull” 
on other states’ alternative entity law, often causing those states 
to mimic Delaware’s approach.131 Fourteen states, including Del-
aware, have statutes adopting Delaware’s contractual freedom 
model, allowing for complete elimination of fiduciary duties.132 
Their courts consequently hew closely to the Delaware ap-
proach.133 
A significant slice of LLCs and LPs therefore organize in 
states that permit, with courts that enforce, wholesale waivers 
of traditional business law fiduciary duties. And since insider 
 
*1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 5, 2013) (“[O]ur law provides broad latitude for LLCs to allo-
cate the rights and responsibilities of its members.”); Fisk Ventures, LLC v. 
Segal, No. C.A. 3017, 2008 WL 1961156, at *8 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2008) (“In the 
context of limited liability companies, which are creatures not of the state but 
of contract, . . . duties or obligations must be found in the LLC Agreement or 
some other contract.”); Haley v. Talcott, 864 A.2d 86, 88 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“A 
princip[al] attraction of the LLC form of entity is the statutory freedom granted 
to members to shape, by contract, their own approach to common business ‘re-
lationship’ problems.”); see also Manesh, supra note 95, at 399–401 (summariz-
ing judicial references to “freedom of contract” among LLCs). 
 128. Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 11.  
 129. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Ju-
risdictional Competition for Limited Liability Companies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 
91 (2011).  
 130. See, e.g., Manesh, supra note 7, at 598 (finding only one publicly traded 
LP organized outside of Delaware, and no publicly traded LLCs). 
 131. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 11, at ¶ 14.01[2]. 
 132. The states are Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Texas, 
and Wisconsin. H. Justin Pace, Contracting Out of Fiduciary Duties in LLCs: 
Delaware Will Lead, but Will Anyone Follow?, 16 NEV. L.J. 1085, 1093–94 (2016) 
The list encompasses categories one through four of the Article. 
 133. See, e.g., JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. KB Home, 632 F. Supp. 2d 
1013 (D. Nev. 2009); Lynch Multimedia Corp. v. Carson Commc’ns, L.L.C., 102 
F. Supp. 2d 1261 (D. Kan. 2000); Alimenta (USA), Inc. v. Oil Seed S., LLC, 622 
S.E.2d 363 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005); Allen v. Devon Energy Holdings, L.L.C., 367 
S.W.3d 355, 396 (Tex. App. 2012). 
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trading liability rests on the existence of breached fiduciary du-
ties, when fiduciary duties vanish, seemingly so too does core in-
sider trading liability. Company executives will be uncon-
strained in their ability to trade in the stock of their companies 
and others based on material, nonpublic information they ac-
quire through their executive roles.134 To determine whether this 
is a problem, and to set up the later discussion on potential so-
lutions, the next Part surveys policy justifications for and 
against insider trading liability. 
III.  INSIDER TRADING LIABILITY’S POLICY 
JUSTIFICATIONS 
Insider trading liability has existed for over a century. The 
merits of this liability have been extensively discussed in the lit-
erature. This Part reviews the policy justifications in favor of in-
sider trading liability, as well as traditional arguments against 
imposing insider trading liability. In doing so, I also assess 
whether there is reason to treat alternative entities differently 
from standard general partnerships and corporations whose 
mandatory fiduciary duties already subject them to mandatory 
insider trading restrictions, setting up the policy discussion that 
follows in Part IV. 
 A. PROTECTING INVESTORS 
One of the main purposes of the 1934 Securities and Ex-
change Act and its Section 10(b) antifraud provisions is to pro-
tect investors.135 Indeed, Section 10(b) expressly directs the SEC 
to promulgate rules and regulations “as necessary or appropriate 
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”136 Insider 
trading restrictions are commonly viewed as a means of protect-
ing investors.  
First, when a regular investor sells to, or buys from, an in-
sider with superior information, the insider’s later profits may 
be seen as coming at the expense of the regular investor.137 Sup-
pose, for example, our investor holds 100 shares in a company 
trading at $100 per share. The company’s CEO, aware of an 
 
 134. Indeed, the problem can extend past the executive level, although cur-
rently most alternative entity fiduciary duty waivers focus on directors and of-
ficers, rather than rank-and-file employees. 
 135. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 2, at 334, 357. 
 136. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 137. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 2, at 360–62. 
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impending announcement that will boost the company’s stock to 
$120 per share, buys shares (including our investor’s) at the cur-
rent market price. When the CEO later sells the shares at $120 
per share, the incremental $20 per share profit, or $2000, from 
our investor’s shares might be seen as belonging to our investor. 
By preventing insider trading, the law keeps this profit out of 
the insider’s hands.138 
A closer look, however, shows that most of the time the in-
sider’s incremental profits actually do not come at our investor’s 
expense. Since our investor had already decided to sell at the 
market price of $100, then the incremental $2000 profit from the 
later increase in value would never have been realized by our 
investor, but instead would have gone to the party that bought 
our investor’s shares. In that case, our investor would have 
missed the extra $2000 profit regardless of the insider’s activ-
ity.139  
This discussion brings up another way that regular inves-
tors might be harmed from insider trading. If our investor would 
not have sold but for the insider’s presence, then the insider 
might cause our investor to suffer foregone profits. Perhaps, for 
example, the insider’s purchases have increased the market 
price to a point where our investor has now decided to sell. Ab-
sent the insider’s presence, prices would not have risen to the 
point that induces our investor to sell at that time. Or perhaps 
the insider’s purchases provide the volume needed to execute 
trades that otherwise would not consummate, as when shares 
are thinly traded, or if they are not publicly traded at all.140 
Again, absent the insider’s presence, our investor would not have 
sold at that price at that time. In these cases, preventing insider 
trading means our investor holds her shares instead of selling 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. LANGEVOORT, supra note 1, § 1.3. In fact, our investor might actually 
benefit from insider trading in this circumstance, if she had already decided to 
sell and if the trader’s activity pushed up the market price at which she sold. 
 140. See, e.g., William K.S. Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Infor-
mation on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom 
Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1236 (1981). Gilson and Kraak-
man have argued that even here, the insider may have little effect when meas-
ured against the entire pool of similar securities, although they have since mod-
erated this position. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms 
of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 630–31 (1984); Ronald J. Gilson & Rein-
ier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: Hind-
sight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715 (2003). 
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them, potentially realizing the gains from the later price in-
crease. 
Insider trading restrictions can be an effective investor pro-
tection tool in this situation. Insider trading proponents have 
noted, however, that the firm itself may also have appropriate 
incentives to prohibit insider trading, making regulatory inter-
vention less necessary. Rational investors who anticipate poten-
tial harm from insider trading will be less likely to buy into the 
firm in the first place. Assuming the firm wants to attract inves-
tors, not drive them away, the firm prohibits insider trading in 
its securities.141 Of course, if there is a deviation between inves-
tors’ and the firm’s wishes, as when investors poorly monitor the 
firm and inadequately protect themselves, regulatory interven-
tion can still be valuable. 
How does this policy justification apply to alternative enti-
ties? In many ways, the case for insider trading liability may be 
stronger for LLCs and LPs than for traditional corporations. 
These uncorporate forms are particularly popular among pri-
vately held firms.142 Private companies are not exempt from in-
sider trading law,143 and the SEC pursues actions against pri-
vately held companies for suspected insider trading violations.144 
The thin markets of privately held firms provide a higher poten-
tial for insider trading to harm investors, in turn providing a 
greater argument for subjecting these entities to increased, ra-
ther than diminished, insider trading restrictions. 
Moreover, some LLCs are chosen by a group of compara-
tively unsophisticated investors who are attracted by the firms’ 
tax advantages, rather than their governance flexibility. These 
investors are no more likely to protect themselves from the po-
tential for insider trading than is the average investor in a cor-
poration, and thus could benefit at least as much from regulatory 
intervention. As discussed above, a regulatory intervention 
makes more sense in those circumstances. 
On the other hand, some alternative entities are organized 
exclusively by sophisticated investors who are attracted to these 
forms’ governance flexibility, rather than their tax advantages. 
These investors are much more likely to protect themselves, 
 
 141. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of In-
sider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 862–63 (1983). 
 142. Chrisman, supra note 6. 
 143. Section 10(b) explicitly applies to both registered as well as unregis-
tered (private) securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018). 
 144. See supra note 18. 
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leading to a reduced need for regulation to provide insider trad-
ing protections for them. 
B. PREVENTING MANAGERIAL MORAL HAZARD 
Another objection to insider trading is that it may incentiv-
ize management to destroy, rather than enhance, company 
value.145 Typically, we want management to have reasons to im-
prove company value. Incentive-based compensation mecha-
nisms, reputational markets, the threat of firing, and legal rules 
all help align management and company incentives. Unsanc-
tioned insider trading, however, potentially defeats these mech-
anisms. Unexpectedly decreasing company value is generally 
easier to do than unexpectedly increasing it.146 Therefore, if an 
insider could trade freely on her private information, some worry 
that she might take a short position in her company stock, take 
steps to destroy company value, and reduce the stock price, lead-
ing her to profit at society’s expense.147 She might lose her job at 
the company in the process; but if she takes a large enough short 
position, then her one-time gains can more than compensate for 
the lost future earnings from her job. Insider trading restrictions 
prohibit insiders from profiting in this way, and provide a disin-
centive to destroying company value. 
Yet, in addition to the somewhat fantastical assumptions 
needed for this justification,148 the problem comes from insider’ 
trading on share price declines, rather than insider trading more 
generally. This concern could be solved simply by prohibiting in-
siders from taking negative positions in their stocks. And, in fact, 
the law already does exactly this. Section 16 of the Securities 
and Exchange Act prohibits statutory insiders of public compa-
nies from uncovered shorting in their company stock.149 And 
since the main way to profit off stock price declines is through 
 
 145. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the 
Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117, 149 (1982). 
 146. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 141, at 873–74. 
 147. This more general phenomenon of “negative activism” is developed 
more completely elsewhere. Barbara A. Bliss, Peter Molk, & Frank Partnoy, 
Negative Activism, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
 148. See MANNE, supra note 20, at 155; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 141, 
at 873–74. 
 149. Securities Exchange Act § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (2018). Statutory 
insiders are defined as directors, officers, and beneficial owners of more than 
10% of the company’s shares. Id. § 78p(a). Uncovered shorting occurs when the 
investor shorts shares without holding an offsetting long position, i.e. bets on a 
company stock decline. 
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uncovered short positions (or the derivative equivalent), this av-
enue is essentially already shut off without having to apply the 
insider trading laws more broadly. 
However, just because the main way that insiders profit 
from stock declines is already removed does not mean the only 
way of profiting from stock declines has been removed. Insider 
trading restrictions are still potentially useful. There are a vari-
ety of indirect ways an insider might profit. For instance, instead 
of shorting her own company, an insider might take a long posi-
tion in a direct competitor, with the expectation that negative 
actions within her own company might increase that competi-
tor’s share price. This alternative approach would not be prohib-
ited by Section 16’s statutory insider section, which applies to 
short, not long, positions.150 This practice does not yet seem 
widely used, perhaps because of its comparative riskiness—it re-
quires one company’s negative news to positively impact an-
other, which is not guaranteed. But that is not to say the practice 
would not be used in the future, as regulatory changes push in-
vestors to seek profits in underexplored ways.  
Perhaps, then, insider trading liability could be justified as 
prohibiting these alternative profit mechanisms that reduce 
company value. Unfortunately, insider trading theories do not 
reach this situation. Under the classical theory, the insider owes 
no fiduciary duties to other companies and those companies’ 
shareholders, so she breaches no classical fiduciary duties when 
trading in those other companies.151 Under the misappropriation 
theory, the insider owes no fiduciary duty of loyalty to her com-
pany, shareholders, or the information’s source when that duty 
has been waived, so she feigns no loyalty, engages in no decep-
tion, and commits no securities fraud when she converts that in-
formation to her own use.152  
Moreover, the negative effects from managerial moral haz-
ard should be fully internalized by the firm, making an external 
legal restriction less useful. A rational management team that is 
responsive to shareholder interests should already be adopting 
voluntary insider trading restrictions if it would benefit inves-
tors. A legal prohibition against insider trading is best justified 
 
 150. Moreover, our company insider would generally not be a statutory in-
sider of the competitor unless she owned 10% of the shares in the competitor. 
See generally Ayres & Bankman, supra note 66 (analyzing several variations of 
this alternative approach). 
 151. See supra Part I.B. 
 152. See supra Part I.B.  
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if investors only poorly monitor management, allowing manage-
ment to pursue its own self-interest instead of the firm’s. 
There is little reason to treat alternative entities differently 
from corporations and general partnerships when applying this 
policy concern. Agency concerns of a poorly monitored manage-
ment are present irrespective of organizational form. At the 
same time, some investors choose LLCs and LPs precisely be-
cause they substitute private incentives for corporate-style pro-
tections and the need to monitor management;153 mandatory in-
sider trading restrictions may have little value for them. 
 C. ENCOURAGING VOLUNTARY RELEASE OF INFORMATION 
Some have argued that insider trading leads to delayed re-
lease of information into the securities markets. Since insiders 
may need time to take a position in their company stock before 
trading, they may delay information releases to accumulate 
their stake first,154 leading to distorted allocations of capital dur-
ing the delay.155 These distortions have negative ramifications 
for capital markets as a whole, so firms will have inadequately 
low private incentives to adopt efficient levels of trading re-
strictions. By eliminating insiders’ profit incentive with an in-
sider trading ban, these informational delays and resulting cap-
ital distortions would be minimized. 
Skeptics argue that while the worry is theoretically valid, 
its practical significance is minimal.156 Many companies’ securi-
ties have liquid markets, so insiders can quickly accumulate sig-
nificant positions.157 Derivatives and the use of leverage also al-
low insiders to take outsized positions with comparatively little 
capital, minimizing any delays from the insider’s having to ac-
quire funds.158 Public companies also face periodic, mandatory 
disclosure requirements, the timing of which they have little 
 
 153. Larry E. Ribstein, Partnership Governance of Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 289, 289–90 (2009). 
 154. See, e.g., Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, In-
sider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1448–49 (1967). 
 155. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inac-
curate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1005–08 (1992). 
 156. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 141, at 879 (noting this concern “is a log-
ical possibility, but has little empirical basis”). 
 157. This is most obviously true among publicly traded companies on na-
tional exchanges. 
 158. Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 775, 787–92. 
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capacity to manipulate, which constrains insiders’ ability to de-
lay releases of certain information.159 Moreover, too much delay 
postpones the profits the insider hopes to earn as well as risks 
losing the profit-making opportunity if the information becomes 
public through other means; any delays, therefore, will be rela-
tively small.  
Particularly for publicly traded companies with liquid mar-
kets and periodic disclosure requirements, insider trading pro-
hibitions may do little to help with the release of information. 
On the other hand, private companies present a greater theoret-
ical concern for informational delay from insider trading. These 
companies are not actively traded, and the insider might require 
additional time to accumulate her desired position before disclos-
ing information. These companies may also not have any deriv-
ative financial instruments, leading the insider to take time to 
stockpile large amounts of capital needed to take large effective 
positions. For these companies, insider trading restrictions 
might be particularly useful for encouraging informational re-
leases. 
If that is so, then this policy argument weighs in favor of 
insider trading restrictions among alternative entities. LLCs are 
especially popular among privately held companies and have 
emerged as the form of choice for new businesses.160 Insider trad-
ing might therefore lead to the most severe comparative infor-
mational delays among these entities; mitigating these delays 
through a mandatory prohibition might provide comparatively 
high returns. 
D. PROTECTING THE PERIODIC DISCLOSURE SYSTEM 
James Park has argued that insider trading prohibitions are 
required to protect the integrity of the periodic disclosure system 
with which public companies must comply.161 Periodic (not con-
tinuous) disclosure requirements give rise to a gap between 
 
 159. The Exchange Act of 1934 gives the requirements for disclosures: Com-
panies must disclose if they are listed on national securities exchanges, if they 
are large with a large number of shareholders, or if they have made a public 
offering of their securities under the Securities Act of 1933. Securities Exchange 
Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (requiring periodic filings); § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a) 
(requiring filing for companies listed on a national securities exchange); § 12(g), 
15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (size); § 15(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d)(1) (public offering). 
 160. See Chrisman, supra note 6. 
 161. James J. Park, Insider Trading and the Integrity of Mandatory Disclo-
sure, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 1133, 1135. 
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when information is discovered and when it must be periodically 
communicated to the public. Park argues that, since the basic 
purpose of the mandatory disclosure system is to “provide [inves-
tors] equal access to the company’s most important information,” 
insider trading in advance of that information’s disclosure needs 
to be restricted.162 If, instead, insider trading on as-yet-undis-
closed financial information were allowed, then securities prices 
would begin to incorporate that financial information in advance 
of the later mandatory disclosure.163 Park argues that ordinary 
investors would begin to lose trust in the mandatory disclosure 
system’s effectiveness, which undermines the basic purpose of 
the system’s existence.164 
Park’s argument is best suited to companies governed by 
public company periodic disclosure requirements. These require-
ments apply to companies listed on national exchanges as well 
as sufficiently large and widely held non-listed companies.165 
While most alternative entities do not fall into these categories, 
many do. A search of the SEC’s EDGAR system, which consoli-
dates disclosures made pursuant to the mandatory disclosure 
system, reveals some 600 LLCs alone making disclosures; once 
limited partnerships are added in, the number is significantly 
greater.166 Protecting the mandatory disclosure system’s integ-
rity would suggest insider trading liability should be extended 
at least to these uncorporate entities. 
E. PROVIDING EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL COMPENSATION 
Zachary Gubler argues that insider trading liability is best 
understood as a means of providing super-contractual damages 
in the event parties breach agreements not to trade on infor-
mation.167 Because the probability of detecting these breaches is 
small, extra-compensatory damages provided under securities 
law are needed to provide an adequate deterrent to breach.168 In 
 
 162. Id. at 1136.  
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Securities Exchange Act §§ 12(a), (g)(1), 15 U.S.C §§ 78l(a), (g)(1) (2018). 
 166. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, EDGAR INVESTOR INFORMATION DATABASE, 
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html [https://perma.cc/ 
AS89-V3VA]. 
 167. Zachary J. Gubler, Insider Trading As Fraud, N.C. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing).  
 168. Id. 
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effect, then, insider trading liability allows parties to contract for 
fraud liability.169 
Under this theory, the need for additional deterrence rests 
on parties’ probabilities of engaging in undetected insider trad-
ing. Gubler sees this need as most pressing among traditional 
insiders, where it is otherwise difficult to restrict their access to 
firm-specific information, and he uses this as a basis to support 
existing insider trading liability’s application to traditional in-
tra-firm relationships.170 But unless it is easier to detect insider 
trading breaches in uncorporate entities, this argument suggests 
imposing restrictions on all firms rather than differentiating by 
organizational form as the fiduciary duty-based approach cur-
rently does. 
F. LOWERING CAPITAL COSTS 
Another argument raised for restricting insider trading is 
the positive effect these restrictions have on firms’ capital costs. 
First, investors may have more trust in the individual companies 
that are subject to insider trading restrictions, making investors 
willing to invest in those companies on more favorable terms.171 
This might be because, for example, the managerial moral haz-
ard costs discussed above are minimized when managers face in-
sider trading restrictions, making these firms more likely to 
maximize shareholder value.172 Or, it might be because inves-
tors, when they buy and sell, are less likely to face someone on 
the other side of the transaction with superior information when 
insider trading is restricted. Since investors need not worry as 
much that their trading partner has superior information, inves-
tors will raise the price at which they will buy and lower the price 
at which they sell, because they face a reduced need to compen-
sate for a comparative informational disadvantage.173 This nar-
rows the bid-ask spread for the firm’s securities, reduces costs 
for investors, and reduces the firm’s cost of capital.174 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See, e.g., Mervyn King & Ailsa Roell, Insider Trading, 3 ECON. POL’Y 
163, 170 (1988) (“Investor confidence is weakened as savers feel that the dice 
are loaded against them in stock market investment.”). 
 172. See supra Part III.B. 
 173. See, e.g., King & Roell, supra note 171, at 170. 
 174. See, e.g., Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Trans-
action Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 
J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1985). But see Pierre Collin-Dufresne & Vyacheslav Fos, Do 
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Critics have pointed out that this argument relies on finan-
cial incentives that should be fully internalized by the firm; the 
firm should therefore already have optimal incentives to prohibit 
insider trading on its own.175 In that case, there is no reason for 
a regulatory insider trading restriction that could be supplied by 
the private actors themselves if appropriate. 
Regulatory proponents also argue that insider trading re-
strictions might lower firms’ capital costs because investors will 
have more trust in markets, making investors willing to invest 
in companies across the board on more favorable terms.176 This 
argument provides a stronger justification for regulatory inter-
vention. When an individual firm allows insider trading, inves-
tors will lose confidence not just in that company but also in the 
markets as a whole.177 In that case, the individual firm no longer 
fully internalizes the reasons to deter insider trading. Instead, 
we are left with a classic externalities problem. When there are 
many firms, private attempts at self-regulation and self-policing 
may not fully solve the problem. This failure makes external reg-
ulation an effective means at correcting for externality effects.178 
Given the SEC’s goal of “promot[ing] a securities market that is 
worthy of the public’s trust and characterized by transparency 
 
Prices Reveal the Presence of Informed Trading?, 70 J. FIN. 1555 (2015) (finding 
that for certain long-lived, private information, insider trading may help mod-
erate bid-ask spreads). 
 175. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 141, at 858–59. 
 176. See, e.g., King & Roell, supra note 171, at 170. 
 177. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (“Although 
informational disparity is inevitable in the securities markets, investors likely 
would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading based on mis-
appropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law.”). See generally Don-
ald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of In-
sider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1325–28 (1999) (discussing 
the investor confidence rationale of insider trading restrictions). 
 178. Some aspects of corporate governance have been successfully addressed 
through self-regulation. Securities exchanges, for example, impose independent 
director requirements on listed companies—despite no external regulatory re-
quirement to do so—as a means of increasing the trustworthiness of listed com-
panies. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.01. See generally 
Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453 (1997) (ad-
vocating for an increased role for securities exchanges in the regulation of secu-
rities markets). However, especially for private LLCs and LPs, private-led ef-
forts are likely to be insufficient. For discussion of this issue in the context of 
LLCs, see Peter Molk, More Ways to Protect LLC Owners and Preserve LLC 
Flexibility, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 181 (2018). 
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and integrity,”179 an insider trading prohibition may fit well 
within the SEC’s purview. 
This justification for regulatory intervention ultimately de-
pends on how the public responds to the presence of insider trad-
ing. While survey evidence indicates the public is deeply dis-
turbed by this practice,180 revealed preferences showed a hearty 
willingness by the public to participate in capital markets even 
before insider trading had any meaningful regulation.181 Some 
therefore argue that there would be little market-wide impact 
from an individual firm’s decision to allow insider trading.182 To 
the extent insider trading restrictions promote participation in 
the securities markets, insider trading restrictions of compa-
nies—whether corporations, partnerships, LLCs, or LPs—could 
be warranted. 
G. PROMOTING INVESTMENT IN INFORMATION 
Another argument for insider trading restrictions is the pro-
tection these restrictions give to firms’ production of information. 
Briefly put, certain types of information can be expensive to gen-
erate but difficult to preserve for the firm’s private use.183 Sup-
pose, for example, that a company is working on a takeover bid 
for another firm. Putting together this bid and generating a val-
uation of the target company involves considerable, costly in-
vestment, yet the resulting information—the potential takeo-
ver—is difficult to keep secret. Anyone working on the deal will 
know this information. If these individuals can then act on the 
 
 179. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT 6 (2013), https:// 
www.sec.gov/files/sec-strategic-plan-2014-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KNK 
-NJ4P]. 
 180. See, e.g., Stuart P. Green & Matthew B. Kugler, When Is It Wrong to 
Trade Stocks on the Basis of Non-Public Information? Public Views of the Mo-
rality of Insider Trading, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 445 (2011). 
 181. The first federal laws on insider trading were not passed until 1933 and 
1934, after exchanges had already operated for many years. Even then, these 
laws were not pursued with significant vigor until 1961’s In re Cady, Roberts & 
Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961). See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 572–76 
(2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J., concurring) (summarizing the statutory and caselaw 
history on insider trading enforcement). 
 182. See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 141, at 880 n.76. Of course, the 
relevant question is whether there is now greater participation with regulation, 
and reliable evidence on this question is difficult to find. 
 183. For development of this argument, see Chestman, 947 F.2d at 576–78; 
Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 1252–57; Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading 
Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 
SUP. CT. REV. 309.  
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information by purchasing shares in the target ahead of the 
takeover bid, the acquisition becomes more costly, decreasing 
the firm’s returns, thereby making the firm less likely to invest 
in generating the information in the first place. Insider trading 
restrictions preserve the firm’s returns on information and its 
incentives to invest in producing this useful information by pro-
hibiting insiders from acting on it. 
Although this argument may justify insider trading re-
strictions for certain types of information, the potential difficulty 
is that it does not present a clear picture for regulatory interven-
tion. Similar to the prior arguments, the firm should already 
have optimal private incentives to prohibit the practice volun-
tarily since the costs of insider trading are shouldered solely by 
the firm.184 If owners are only ineffective monitors, regulation 
makes more sense. Because alternative entities appeal to some 
of the most sophisticated and least sophisticated investors, this 
argument weighs in favor of restrictions for at least some alter-
native entities. 
H. PROMOTING FAIRNESS 
Finally, some justify insider trading restrictions based on 
fairness considerations. It is difficult for many to tolerate the 
idea of company management, entrusted with running the firm, 
earning profits that might otherwise accrue to shareholders by 
trading on the information they learn through their manage-
ment position. Survey results suggest significant dissatisfaction 
among the public with this practice.185 This dissatisfaction, to 
the extent it carries over into decreased participation by the pub-
lic in securities markets,186 may have some efficiency costs, but 
some insider trading regulatory advocates argue for banning the 
practice even independent of any efficiency effects, on fairness 
grounds.187 And, since these fairness considerations by definition 
 
 184. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 141, at 878–79. 
 185. Green & Kugler, supra note 180, at 484. 
 186. Indeed, some have explicitly tied fairness considerations to the worry 
about decreased participation in capital markets. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fair-
ness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in 
the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 470 (2001).  
 187. See, e.g., Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading 
Law, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 353, 353 (1988) (recognizing that “[a]rguments against 
insider trading tend either to have an economic emphasis or a moral one . . . [but 
that] [t]he more important argument against insider trading is that it is unfair, 
either in the sense that it is dishonest or in the sense that it simply does not 
allow everyone an equal opportunity to profit”). But cf. D. Daniel Sokol, 
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are independent of efficiency considerations, they will not be 
fully internalized by individual firms, making regulation justi-
fied. 
Critics of regulation rationally point out the difficulty this 
fairness stance faces when one considers, as discussed above, 
that insider trading often does not harm investors, and in fact 
may even help some.188 Moreover, if companies authorize insider 
trading, or there are no restrictions, then logically there should 
be nothing “unfair” about the practice: it is as permissible as any 
other legal act.189 
In spite of these responses, the fairness objection has not 
disappeared during the decades that insider trading restrictions 
have been in force and publicly debated. It is not difficult190 to 
find modern references to insider trading’s perceived unfairness, 
despite over fifty years of debate since Henry Manne offered one 
of the first comprehensive defenses of the practice.191 If the pub-
lic perceives the practice to be unfair, despite rational arguments 
 
Rethinking the Efficiency of the Common Law, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forth-
coming 2020) (arguing that the use of a purely economic goal can potentially 
lead to greater efficiency). Recently, this dissatisfaction expressed itself in the 
push for members of Congress to be prohibited from insider trading. For analy-
sis of the fairness issue in this context, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider 
Trading Inside the Beltway, 36 J. CORP. L. 281, 300–01 (2011). For general anal-
ysis of insider trading restrictions for members of Congress, see Matthew 
Barbabella et al., Insider Trading in Congress: The Need for Regulation, 9 J. 
BUS. & SEC. L. 199 (2009). 
 188. See supra Part III.A. 
 189. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 141, at 881–82 (arguing that if share-
holders voluntarily authorized insider trading, then they have no reason to raise 
fairness objections); Merritt B. Fox, et al., Informed Trading and Its Regulation, 
43 J. CORP. L. 817, 841–42 (2018) (arguing that “[o]verall, it is hard to argue 
that fundamental value informed trading creates unfairness”).  
 190. See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 13, Salman v. United States, 137 
S. Ct. 420 (2016) (noting that reducing insider trading restrictions “would seri-
ously harm investors and damage confidence in the fairness of the nation’s se-
curities markets”); Madelyn La France et al., Securities Fraud, 55 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1677, 1712 n.243 (2018); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Tipper/Tippee Insider 
Trading as Unlawful Deceptive Conduct: Insider Gifts of Material Nonpublic 
Information to Strangers, 56 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 65, 96 (2018) (“[R]easonable 
minds can disagree about whether (and, if so, under what circumstances) tip-
ping by insiders . . . makes public securities markets unfair.”); see also Editorial, 
Dark Clouds Loom Over Chris Collins, BUFFALO NEWS (Aug. 10, 2018), https:// 
buffalonews.com/2018/08/09/editorial-dark-clouds-loom-over-chris-collins 
[https://perma.cc/X9XH-8QCB] (“Insider trading cheats other stock buyers by 
creating an unfair playing field.”). 
 191. MANNE, supra note 20. 
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to the contrary, then that perception can still translate to in-
creases in market-wide capital costs that could justify regula-
tion.192 Non-economic considerations might also justify regula-
tion independent of traditional economic justifications. 
If fairness justifies regulating insider trading among gen-
eral partnerships and corporations, it is difficult to see why cir-
cumstances differ for alternative entities. On the one hand, some 
LLCs and LPs have investor bases indistinguishable from the 
typical corporation or general partnership. The same fairness 
considerations that support regulation should therefore apply. 
On the other hand, as already noted, LLCs and LPs also may 
feature some of the most sophisticated investors who are con-
cerned more with financials and less with fairness.193 Fairness 
considerations may not be appropriate for those entities. 
I. ARGUMENTS AGAINST INSIDER TRADING LIABILITY 
The prior subparts have laid out the arguments in favor of 
insider trading liability and showed how these arguments are at 
least as applicable to certain alternative entities as they are to 
traditional corporations and general partnerships. In doing so, I 
have also highlighted how insider trading advocates have re-
sponded to these arguments. 
However, proponents of legalized insider trading do not con-
fine themselves merely to identifying weaknesses in traditional 
regulatory justifications. They also have arguments about why 
insider trading may be desirable on its own merits. These argu-
ments are generally along the lines that insider trading can im-
prove economic efficiency, although the manner in which this ef-
ficiency is improved takes several forms. I summarize them 
below and assess their application to alternative entities. 
1. Encouraging Release of Information 
One way that proponents argue insider trading can improve 
efficiency is through increasing the flow of information that 
reaches the public marketplace. Ironically, this is also an argu-
ment against legalized insider trading.194 Yet in some ways in-
sider trading has the potential to bring nonpublic information to 
 
 192. See, e.g., Heminway, supra note 190, at 97 (noting that “the perception 
of unfairness or harm may be more important than the reality”). 
 193. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 194. See supra Part III.C. 
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light more quickly, and more often, than a system where this 
trading is prohibited.  
Companies and management have strong existing incen-
tives to publicize positive information about their operations. 
Positive information increases companies’ share prices, which 
the company and its management have several reasons to do. 
Managers who receive performance-based compensation have a 
self-interested reason to increase share prices.195 Managers may 
also invest in their employer firms’ securities, giving them more 
reason to produce positive information that boosts share 
prices.196 Disclosing positive information, and raising share 
prices, may also ensure managers keep their jobs, or develop pos-
itive reputations to land better jobs, as the stewards of firms 
with high share prices. Or, since higher share prices make it eas-
ier for the company to raise future financing, there is still an-
other reason to release positive news voluntarily. 
However, these forces that push for voluntary disclosure of 
positive information also push for withholding negative infor-
mation. Voluntarily disclosing negative information tends to un-
dermine managers’ and their company’s interests; consequently, 
we can expect voluntary disclosure of disproportionately positive 
news. The resulting biased picture of a firm’s operations can re-
sult in share mispricing and a misallocation of capital.  
Analysts and investors might discover and disclose this neg-
ative information to correct the biased picture, but the process is 
costly, and the incentives are often incomplete due to limits on 
many institutional investors’ shorting activity.197 The SEC’s 
whistleblower program provides another means of incentivizing 
negative information disclosure, but the program has been only 
modestly successful so far.198 Legalized insider trading can help 
 
 195. For evidence on the widespread use of performance-based pay, see Alex 
Edmans, et al., Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence fig. 
6 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 6585, July 2017).  
 196. Indeed, these additional holdings can counteract to some degree the ef-
fectiveness of incentive-based compensation. Eli Ofek & David Yermack, Taking 
Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership, 
55 J. FIN. 1367 (2000). 
 197. For additional discussion on this issue, see Peter Molk & Frank 
Partnoy, Institutional Investors as Short Sellers?, 99 B.U. L. REV. 837 (2019). 
 198. Although the SEC paid a record total amount of whistleblower rewards 
in fiscal year 2017–18, those awards were paid to only thirteen individuals. See 
Mengqi Sun, SEC Whistleblower Program Has Record-Breaking Year, WALL 
STREET J. Nov. 16, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-whistleblower 
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correct this biased picture. By taking short positions in stocks, 
insiders can profit from releasing negative information, encour-
aging them to release negative information that otherwise would 
not be released, or that would be released after delay.199 Because 
this negative information moves securities prices towards their 
fundamental values, insider trading can promote efficiency of 
the capital markets.200 
In principle, it should make no difference for this argument 
whether the entities whose insiders trade are corporations, gen-
eral partnerships, LLCs, or LPs. Accurate pricing of capital is an 
important advantage of both privately held companies and pub-
licly traded ones, and alternative entities, just like corporations 
and general partnerships, encompass both groups.201 
2. Efficient Management Compensation 
Another theoretical justification for legalized insider trad-
ing is its usefulness as a management compensation device. This 
argument has multiple components. First, some have argued 
that paying management through legalized insider trading 
serves a useful sorting function, identifying the best, least risk-
averse managers.202 Others have argued that insider trading is 




 199. These disclosures might occur later because they are mandated by pe-
riodic disclosure requirements or because independent analysts discover the in-
formation after costly searching (which introduces additional market-wide 
costs). See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 141, at 867. 
 200. Of course, the insider might have reason to release information solely 
to induce a stock price movement, whether or not that information is accurate. 
Fortunately, general antifraud and anti-manipulation laws prohibit this activ-
ity independent of fiduciary relationships. Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 
U.S.C. § 78j (2018) (prohibiting both manipulation and fraud); see also Basic, 
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 244 (1988) (discussing components of general securi-
ties fraud claims); ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 101 
(2d Cir. 2007) (discussing components of securities manipulation claims). 
 201. It is worth noting that insider trading encourages releasing negative 
information only when the insider can profit from that disclosure, principally 
by taking a short position in her company. While shorting is easy for most pub-
licly traded companies, it is not an option for many privately held ones. So, this 
potential advantage of legalized insider trading largely does not apply to most 
alternative entities, which are privately held. Of course, the same is true for 
most partnerships and corporations as well. 
 202. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 141, at 871–72. 
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compensation, rewarding managers for producing unexpected 
gains for the firm.203 
Others have questioned these advantages. Gains from in-
sider trading may be determined by the insider’s financial lever-
age and luck in coming across information rather than the value 
of information produced, leading to a haphazard relationship be-
tween value-added and personal payoff.204 In fact, most of the 
high-profile Supreme Court cases that developed insider trading 
law dealt with insider traders who were not responsible for add-
ing value to the company.205 Compensating based on random-
ness, rather than the value provided by the insider as measured 
by stock prices, provides questionable incentives. 
Another objection to insider trading as compensation is the 
excessive risk that this compensation imposes on management. 
Because insider trading returns will vary significantly over time, 
depending on whether material, nonpublic information has been 
produced, this type of compensation is analogous to paying man-
agement with lottery tickets.206 Risk-averse management will 
significantly discount the value of this compensation, but the 
firm pays the higher expected value, leading to an inefficient 
compensation arrangement.207 
Finally, critics have pointed to the rise of new methods of 
incentive-based compensation that provide some of the compen-
satory advantages from insider trading, without the downsides. 
A wide array of individualized compensation agreements, stock 
options, and profit-sharing plans provide most of the direct in-
centive benefits that insider trading could provide, while ensur-
ing that people are paid based on the value they provide, rather 
than based on an arbitrary link to access to material, nonpublic 
information.208 
 
 203. Id. at 871; MANNE, supra note 20, at 110–20; Henry G. Manne, In De-
fense of Insider Trading, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov–Dec. 1966, at 113, 117–19. 
 204. See generally Robert B. Thompson, Insider Trading, Investor Harm, 
and Executive Compensation, 50 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 291, 302 (1999) 
(noting the arbitrary relationship between traders on inside information and 
the parties responsible for producing that information). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Easterbrook, supra note 183, at 332. However, because these effects 
should be fully internalized among the firm, its management, and its investors, 
they provide a comparatively weak reason to impose regulatory restrictions. 
 207. Id. See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 605 (2002) (“[I]nsider trading is an inefficient compensation 
scheme.”). 
 208. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 204, at 302–03. 
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These objections have been powerful. Today’s consensus 
seems to be that insider trading is a poor means of executive 
compensation.209 Because the arguments are independent of the 
firm’s ownership characteristics or whether shares are publicly 
or privately traded, this suggests the same outcome for alterna-
tive entities as for general partnerships and corporations. If an-
ything, since LLCs and LPs already frequently feature tailored 
compensation arrangements to align management incentives 
with those of investors,210 any additional efficiencies from au-
thorizing insider trading might therefore be comparatively small 
for them. 
3. Avoiding Costs from Incorrect Prosecutions 
Finally, although not traditionally raised as an ad-
vantage,211 legalized trading potentially frees the firm and its 
management from the costs (financial and otherwise) of defend-
ing against insider trading suits. As with any source of liability, 
insider trading liability has some identification error,212 and its 
targets can be chosen somewhat arbitrarily.213 While the prob-
lem is no doubt less severe214 than the nonmeritorious duty of 
 
 209. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 207, at 591–92 (summarizing argu-
ments against insider trading as a compensation mechanism); George W. Dent, 
Jr., Why Legalized Insider Trading Would Be a Disaster, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
247, 251–56 (2013); Easterbrook, supra note 183, at 332. 
 210. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 153, at 290–98. 
 211. For example, Manne’s classic works do not explicitly consider the issue, 
although he examines related disadvantages to those who have to bring suit 
(rather than to the targets of those suits). MANNE, supra note 20, at 159–69; 
Manne, supra note 203. See generally Carlton & Fischel, supra note 141, at 866–
72 (not including this potential advantage in their arguments for legalizing in-
sider trading). 
 212. Prosecution of insider trading is imperfect even when brought by com-
paratively neutral public regulators, as opposed to private parties. These suits 
not only impose financial defense costs, much of which may be borne by external 
insurers, but also distract insiders from their work. Mark Cuban’s prosecution 
by the SEC provides a recent example of a high-profile public prosecution that 
failed to yield a conviction. Jury Charge/Verdict at 7:156–8:165, SEC v. Cuban, 
No. 08-cv-2050-D (N.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2013).  
 213. Those critical of insider trading liability have charitably described the 
practice as “arbitrary.” MANNE, supra note 20, at 161. 
 214. Although we might hope that insider trading prosecutions are targeted 
with greater precision than duty-of-care suits, another reason to be less con-
cerned about overly broad insider trading targeting is that these “false posi-
tives” impose primarily financial and distraction costs. On the other hand, pur-
suing duty-of-care claims against managers that made risky, yet desirable, 
business decisions imposes the same categories of costs, and in addition might 
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care cases that evoked Delaware’s 102(b)(7) exculpation re-
sponse,215 the basic principle is the same. Rational investors that 
fully trust management to refrain from insider trading, or who 
are unconcerned by the potential, may be better off if they know 
company resources and management’s attention would not be di-
verted by defending these suits. 
This potential advantage might be particularly compelling 
for alternative entities with very financially sophisticated inves-
tors, who choose the forms precisely because of their ability to 
jettison traditional corporate law protections for tailored con-
tractual alternatives.216 When these tight private ordering solu-
tions already closely align manager and investor interests, there 
is less reason to worry about any distortionary effects from man-
agerial insider trading. A fiduciary duty waiver (and, by exten-
sion, insider trading waivers) in that context could make sense 
when the threat of insider trading prosecutions imposes more 
costs than benefits.217 
On the other hand, some LLCs and LPs closely resemble the 
circumstances where insider trading liability’s benefits and po-
tential for imperfect targeting nevertheless outweigh the costs. 
Some companies have less sophisticated owners who are poorly 
positioned to monitor management; others have widely dis-
persed ownership bases who lack the incentive to monitor man-
agement; others fail to adopt tailored restrictions to align man-
ager-owner incentives. In these situations, insider trading 
liability might, on average, reasonably provide more benefits 
than costs from occasionally targeting innocent managers.  
IV.  APPLYING INSIDER TRADING RESTRICTIONS 
As the prior Part reveals, indiscriminately allowing alterna-
tive entities to eliminate insider trading liability, while still im-
posing liability on general partnerships and corporations, does 
not produce an ideal policy outcome. Many LLCs and LPs are 
indistinguishable from their partnership and corporate counter-
parts in their need to protect investors, so policy arguments for 
regulating general partnerships and corporations also apply to 
 
deter these managers from taking those desirable risks in the future. See, e.g., 
William T. Allen, et al., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care 
with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as a 
Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449, 462–63 (2002). 
 215. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2013). 
 216. See, e.g., Molk, supra note 14, at 505. 
 217. Id. at 513–15. 
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regulating at least these LLCs and LPs. Whether justified as cor-
recting for externalities, as protecting investors, as protecting 
the periodic disclosure system, or as protecting fairness, so long 
as insider trading liability remains justified for traditional or-
ganizational forms, it should apply to at least some alternative 
entities.  
However, some LLCs and LPs are different from general 
partnerships and corporations. These uncorporate entities rep-
resent a maximal commitment to governance flexibility that at-
tracts particularly sophisticated investors, and saddling this 
group with mandatory protections may not only be unnecessary, 
but also could reduce welfare.218 
The task that naturally follows is to figure out what to do 
about this situation. Here, I consider techniques to reattach in-
sider trading liability to LLCs and LPs. I seek to place these pro-
posals within the existing framework of insider trading law, dis-
turbing that framework as little as possible to maximize the 
likelihood of implementation. If we were designing insider trad-
ing liability afresh, we might well prefer something that deviates 
dramatically from these approaches;219 but that is not the situa-
tion in which we find ourselves.  
I first consider whether focusing on alternative entities’ lone 
mandatory governance protection, the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, might provide a viable option. I show that 
although this option might be easy to implement, it is unsatisfy-
ing from an enforcement perspective, and its application would 
be overly broad.  
 
 218. See supra Part III.I for a discussion of these costs. 
 219. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal 
for Insider Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 226–28 (1991) (proposing 
that insider trading liability be based on an insider’s status, rather than an in-
sider’s fiduciary duties); Michael D. Guttentag, Selective Disclosure and Insider 
Trading, 69 FLA. L. REV. 519, 565–69 (2017) (suggesting reforms for determin-
ing when selective disclosure by tippers will invoke insider trading liability); 
Roberta S. Karmel, The Fiduciary Principle of Insider Trading Needs Revision, 
56 WASH. U. L.J. & POL’Y 121, 134 (2018) (proposing a statutory definition for 
insider trading); Nagy, supra note 67, at 48 (proposing tipper-tippee liability be 
linked to the duty of loyalty—which would be effective only if the duty of loyalty 
were mandatory as it is for corporations and general partnerships—or that in-
sider trading instead be reconceptualized as using information that was wrong-
fully obtained); Yesha Yadav, Insider Trading and Market Structure, 63 UCLA 
L. REV. 968, 1026–30 (2016) (proposing reforms to insider trading doctrine to 
address high frequency traders). 
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Ultimately, I argue that imposing a mandatory fiduciary 
duty upon LLCs and LPs offers the most promise. There is sub-
stantial room for reasonable minds to debate the scope and ap-
plication of this duty, but the duty would provide a reliable 
means of reconnecting insider trading liability to alternative en-
tities. I offer thoughts on where the debate should be focused and 
two ways in which the debate could be resolved. 
 A. IMPOSE LIABILITY THROUGH THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF 
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
One reform possibility is to impose liability through the sin-
gle mandatory governance protection demanded of alternative 
entities: the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.220 
The implied covenant is not an independent fiduciary duty; in-
stead, it is a doctrine from contract law designed primarily to fill 
contract gaps consistent with parties’ expectations,221 deterring 
unreasonable conduct that “frustrat[es] the fruits of the bar-
gain.”222 The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing thus 
ensures that silences in LLC and LP governance agreements, 
which are just a type of contract, are interpreted to reflect the 
general intentions of the parties.223 Perhaps, therefore, the im-
plied covenant could hold insiders liable for trading on inside in-
formation. After all, do investors buy into a company expecting 
management to engage in insider trading if the agreement does 
not explicitly allow the practice? Without express authorization 
in the governance agreement, perhaps this argument would 
have some force. 
There are several significant hurdles to overcome for this 
argument to work. First, courts have been careful to point out 
the restraint with which they apply the implied covenant to al-
ternative entity governance agreements. Delaware courts char-
acterize it as a “cautious enterprise,”224 designed only to address 
“developments or contractual gaps that the asserting party 
pleads neither party anticipated.”225 If there is indeed such a 
 
 220. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-1101(d), 18-1101(c) (West 2010) (imposing 
liability to LPs and LLCs respectively). 
 221. See, e.g., Nationwide Emerging Managers, LLC v. Northpointe Hold-
ings, LLC, 112 A.3d 878, 897 (Del. 2015); Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 
1125 (Del. 2010). 
 222. Nemec, 991 A.2d at 1126. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 1125. 
 225. Id. 
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gap, courts apply the implied covenant to fill the gap to match 
the parties’ presumed intent if those parties had “considered the 
issue in their original bargaining positions at the time of con-
tracting,”226 rather than in the way the court thinks is fair or 
equitable.227 But, when an alternative entity agreement elimi-
nates all fiduciary duties in its governance agreement, courts 
have signaled they will be “all the more hesitant to resort to the 
implied covenant” for any purpose, let alone for analyzing fidu-
ciary duties, because eliminating all fiduciary duties “implies an 
agreement that losses should remain where they fall.”228 Ag-
grieved investors would have to overcome this skepticism when 
pleading that insider trading should be restricted despite the 
governance agreement’s waiver of all fiduciary duties. 
Courts are similarly reluctant to use the implied covenant 
to provide protection “when the contract could easily have been 
drafted to expressly provide for it.”229 It is easy to draft language 
expressly governing insider trading: specify that insiders either 
owe a fiduciary duty, or that insiders are prohibited from trading 
while in possession of material, nonpublic information about 
their company.  
A party bringing insider trading within the implied cove-
nant must therefore argue that despite completely waiving fidu-
ciary duties of loyalty, care, and good faith towards both the com-
pany and its owners, and despite failing to have language that 
reimposes insider trading liability, insiders nevertheless act in a 
way the owners would not have sanctioned when they trade on 
inside information.230 This argument is difficult to make. The 
fact that owners have waived fiduciary duties across the board 
suggests at least indirect permission for insider trading from in-
vestors. And, since owners could have expressly provided for 
 
 226. Gerber v. Enter. Prods. Holdings, LLC, 67 A.3d 400, 418 (Del. 2013). 
 227. NAMA Holdings, LLC v. Related WMC LLC, C.A. No. 7934, 2014 WL 
6436647, at *17 (Del. Ch. Nov. 17, 2014); accord Miller v. HCP & Co., C.A. No. 
2017-0291, 2018 WL 656378, at *9 (Del. Ch. Feb. 1, 2018). 
 228. Lonergan v. EPE Holdings, LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1018 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 229. Nationwide Emerging Managers, LLC v. Northpointe Holdings, LLC, 
112 A.3d 878, 897 (Del. 2015). For additional discussion of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing in the LLC and LP context, see generally Mohsen 
Manesh, Express Contract Terms and the Implied Contractual Covenant of Del-
aware Law, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2013). 
 230. See Manesh, supra note 229, at 34 (stating that the legal standard used 
in this situation is “good faith and reason”). 
 
2020] UNCORPORATE INSIDER TRADING 1739 
 
protection in their governance agreements, court dictum sug-
gests a reluctance to intervene.231 
On the other hand, one might plausibly argue that investors 
who waive fiduciary duties do not realize the implication these 
waivers will have on insider trading liability. At the very least, 
aggrieved investors might argue that explicit waivers of fiduci-
ary duties were not intended to imply an explicit waiver of in-
sider trading liability, particularly given the scant attention 
most courts have paid to insider trading’s fiduciary duty require-
ment to date.232 Thus, while the implied covenant might not sup-
plant a governance agreement that explicitly authorized insider 
trading, perhaps it could be stretched to cover the situation when 
the agreement is silent on insider trading but explicit on fiduci-
ary duties. 
Even if this argument is successful, it presents a second-best 
solution. While private investors might be able to sue on the im-
plied covenant theory, it is difficult to see how the SEC or any 
public entity could prosecute insider trading this way. Breaching 
the implied covenant corresponds to breaching a contract, not 
breaching a fiduciary duty.233 Thus, while investors in the com-
pany might bring private actions against management, an im-
plied covenant breach would not provide the SEC with the fidu-
ciary hook necessary for public prosecution. Nor could the SEC 
sue for the breach of contract unless it somehow constituted an 
intended third-party beneficiary of the contract, since it is not a 
party to governance contracts, which are agreements among in-
vestors and management. With the SEC’s comparative ad-
vantages in identifying and pursuing suspected insider trading 
cases,234 relying exclusively on private investors to police this 
 
 231. Nationwide Emerging Managers, 112 A.3d at 897. 
 232. As discussed earlier, little attention has been necessary because, until 
recently, the principal means of doing business all retained mandatory fiduciary 
duties. See supra notes 83–88 and accompanying text. 
 233. See, e.g., Manesh, supra note 83, at 93–95 (discussing case law, stat-
utes, and uniform act evidence to this effect). 
 234. Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 1263 (“That the Commission has a com-
parative advantage is fairly easy to demonstrate.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In-
sider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between Property Rights 
and Securities Fraud, 52 S.M.U. L. REV. 1589, 1644 (1999) (noting the SEC’s 
“comparative advantage in detecting and prosecuting insider trading” although 
characterizing the prohibition’s “location in the federal securities laws as a his-
torical accident”). This is not to say that there is widespread agreement that the 
SEC would have been the natural enforcement apparatus if we had to rebuild 
insider trading enforcement from scratch. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE 
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behavior seems a distant second best solution. Consequently, I 
recommend another solution: to reimpose fiduciary duties on al-
ternative entities. 
B. MANDATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
Another way to extend insider trading liability is to focus on 
the fiduciary relationship between core insiders and investors in 
their companies, and use this relationship to establish a manda-
tory fiduciary duty whose breach results in classical and misap-
propriation insider trading liability. Even when fiduciary duties 
have been waived, courts in states like Delaware still categorize 
core insiders as fiduciaries. Writing about LLCs, then-Chancel-
lor Strine noted:  
It seems obvious that, under traditional principles of equity, a manager 
of an LLC would qualify as a fiduciary of that LLC and its mem-
bers . . . . The manager of an LLC—which is in plain words a limited 
liability “company” having many of the features of a corporation—eas-
ily fits the definition of a fiduciary. The manager of an LLC has 
more than an arms-length, contractual relationship with the members 
of the LLC. Rather, the manager is vested with discretionary power to 
manage the business of the LLC. . . . Thus, our cases have to date come 
to the following place based on the statute. The statute incorporates 
equitable principles. Those principles view the manager of an LLC as 
a fiduciary and subject the manager as a default principle to the core 
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care. But, the statute allows the parties 
to an LLC agreement to entirely supplant those default principles or to 
modify them in part. Where the parties have clearly supplanted default 
principles in full, we give effect to the parties’ contract choice.235 
If management remains the fiduciary of the company and its in-
vestors even when traditional fiduciary duties are waived,236 it 
 
GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 103 (1993) (questioning if the burden to 
police insider trading is lessened by moving to the public sector); David D. Had-
dock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1449, 1451 (1986) (arguing the SEC may be unnecessary). 
 235. Auriga Capital Corp v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 850–52 (Del. Ch. 
2012) (citations omitted). 
 236. Determining when a fiduciary relationship exists, while often doctri-
nally clear in enumerated circumstances, is itself a topic of academic debate. 
For examples, see Evan J. Criddle, Liberty in Loyalty: A Republican Theory of 
Fiduciary Law, 95 TEX. L. REV. 993, 1000 (2017) (arguing that fiduciary rela-
tionships should be recognized “whenever a party has been entrusted with 
power over another’s legal or practical interests”); Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fi-
duciary Duties, 58 MCGILL L.J. 969, 1010–11 (2013) (noting difficulties that 
scholarship has had in defining fiduciary relationships, and advocating a rela-
tionship as one “in which one party (the fiduciary) exercises discretionary power 
over the significant practical interests of another (the beneficiary)”). Often, fi-
duciary duty analysis starts by finding a fiduciary relationship and then 
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becomes a comparatively easy step for the law to institute a man-
datory fiduciary duty—the fiduciary role is already estab-
lished—whose breach constitutes the means necessary for in-
sider trading liability. 
A fiduciary duty solution comes with three main issues that 
I address below. First, should the duty be imposed through state 
law, or through federal law? Second, what should be the scope of 
this new duty? Finally, should this duty (and therefore insider 
trading liability) be a mandatory duty, a default duty, or a mix-
ture: mandatory for some, and default for others? 
1. Source of the Duty 
We must first decide whether the fiduciary duty should be 
determined by federal or by state law. This is a separate issue 
from whether federal actors (like the SEC) or state actors should 
be enforcing the law;237 the SEC’s history and expertise in this 
area suggests that relying exclusively on nonfederal actors 
would not make sense at this point.238 Instead, the issue is 
whether the fiduciary duty that triggers federal insider trading 
liability should be a product of uniform federal law, or instead 
state law subject to variation across states. 
Federally-defined liability in this area is often justified as 
promoting principles of uniformity, making it easier to police li-
ability and easing investors’ burden of determining their govern-
ance protections.239 Roberta Karmel has further argued that uni-
form federalization is necessary to realize the broader disclosure 
regime of federal securities law.240 For those who justify insider 
trading liability as promoting nationwide investment in securi-
ties markets, imposing uniform liability through a mandatory 
federal fiduciary duty would be entirely appropriate. 
But state law is another source. In considering the source of 
fiduciary duties that give rise to insider trading liability, 
 
considering what fiduciary duties follow, rather than the other way around; a 
waiver of traditional fiduciary duties would therefore not, by itself, imply a lack 
of fiduciary relationship. 
 237. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 1266–68 (noting the appropri-
ateness of having the SEC enforce insider trading even if based on state-defined 
fiduciary rights). 
 238. See Bainbridge, supra note 234. 
 239. See, e.g., Steginsky v. Xcelera, Inc., 741 F.3d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(arguing in favor of a federal system). 
 240. Karmel, supra note 219, at 125; Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading 
on Confidential Information – A Breach in Search of a Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 
83, 111–12 (1998). 
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Stephen Bainbridge has championed a state-based approach, 
recommending that insider trading policy goals could best be re-
alized if the states, rather than the federal government, defined 
the relevant fiduciary relationships.241 He argues that principles 
of federalism caution against intruding on areas such as fiduci-
ary duties that have traditionally been left to the states to de-
fine.242 In addition, since Bainbridge views insider trading liabil-
ity as justified as a private property protection regime, he argues 
the federal government has little public interest to be promoted 
from a uniform federal standard.243 Fiduciary duties imposed by 
the state of organization provide another option for reforming 
alternative entity insider trading liability because fiduciary du-
ties typically fall within the domain of state regulation and 
courts already look to state law fiduciary duty breaches to trig-
ger insider trading liability.244  
With policy arguments in favor of either federal or state-
based definitions of fiduciary duties, perhaps doctrine might de-
termine the choice. Precedent reveals a strong suggestion that 
the fiduciary duty arises out of state law by linking fiduciary dis-
cussions to traditional state fiduciary duties, particularly in the 
misappropriation theory context, but not a binding prohibition 
against federal law defining the duty. There appears to be room 
for the fiduciary duty to arise out of either state or federal law. 
Because the Supreme Court has not ruled definitively on the is-
sue, there are, in Stephen Bainbridge’s words, two possibilities: 
either “a unique rule of federal common law that applies uni-
formly throughout the nation” or “state law as the federal 
rule.”245 So while many have assumed the requisite fiduciary 
duty for insider trading liability comes from state law, one could 
also argue for a federal fiduciary duty. 
The Second Circuit took precisely this approach in its recent 
Steginsky v. Xcelera Inc. opinion, imposing a new federal 
 
 241. Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 1201–12; Bainbridge, supra note 234, at 
1626–27. Bainbridge is not the only prominent academic to advocate a state-
centric approach to defining insider trading liability. See, e.g., ROMANO, supra 
note 234, at 112–17; Larry E. Ribstein, Federalism and Insider Trading, 6 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 123, 154–58 (1998). 
 242. Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 1266–68. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See supra Part I. 
 245. Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 1208. 
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common law fiduciary duty on company insiders.246 By adopting 
this duty against insider trading, the court noted that “looking 
to idiosyncratic differences in state law would thwart the goal of 
promoting national uniformity in securities markets.”247 While 
perhaps true, this single conclusory sentence constitutes the 
bulk of the court’s engagement with the fiduciary duty topic, 
leaving unanswered key issues like the scope of the duty, the 
precise nature of the duty, to whom the duty should apply, and 
why the advantages of a uniform federal approach outweigh po-
tential advantages from a state-based one. 
If the goal is to impose a single federal uniform liability, 
Congress and the SEC are additional options beyond federal 
courts. The SEC has already done so, in another context, through 
Rule 10b5-2, enumerating circumstances where a duty of trust 
or confidence for misappropriation theory liability is presumed 
to arise.248 Congress has supplied fiduciary duties in other cir-
cumstances, such as the duties of loyalty and prudence required 
of investment advisors governed by ERISA.249 Federal law also 
already shapes, directly and indirectly, various areas of tradi-
tionally state-based corporate law, including the law of insider 
trading.250 But the Department of Labor’s recent failed attempt 
to do the same among investment advisors shows the resistance 
that these efforts can face.251  
 
 246. 741 F.3d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 2014); accord United States v. Whitman, 555 
Fed. App’x 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 247. Steginsky, 741 F.3d at 371.  
 248. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2018). Not all have embraced the SEC’s rule-
making here, however, believing it stretches the bounds of judicially-defined li-
ability. United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 234–35 (2d Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A] fiduciary duty cannot 
be imposed unilaterally by entrusting a person with confidential information.”); 
Gubler, supra note 167, at 62 (“[W]hile the rule is valid, it is probably at the 
limit of the SEC’s authority . . . .”); Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the 
Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1323–24 (2009) 
(arguing that SEC authority is limited when there is no fiduciary relationship).  
 249. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2018). 
 250. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 
614 (2003) (discussing the interplay between Delaware law and federal law on 
corporate issues generally, and insider trading in particular). 
 251. See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard, Court Overturns Obama-Era Rule on Re-
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It is not my goal to rehash completely all the arguments for 
federal or state liability that have already received extended at-
tention elsewhere.252 The comparative advantages of federal ver-
sus state are likely dwarfed by the benefits of having a fiduciary 
duty in place to deter insider trading liability, regardless of that 
duty’s source. In other words, reinstating insider trading liabil-
ity among alternative entities should be the primary goal, 
whether done through the federal or state level. 
That being said, there are some potential advantages to a 
uniform minimal federal standard, particularly among compa-
nies traded on national exchanges. In addition to easier enforce-
ment by the SEC and other national regulators, and avoiding the 
difficulty of getting many states all to revise their individual al-
ternative entity statutes, insider trading liability may be neces-
sary to protect the integrity of the federal disclosure regime.253 
Mandatory insider trading liability for all public companies 
would therefore be a good place to start,254 and that liability 
could be imposed most expeditiously by federal law. 
Beyond this limited category, however, there seems to be 
less federal policy interest in a uniform standard; additional lia-
bility could therefore be defined through state law fiduciary du-
ties of loyalty. As I discuss shortly, and as the prior discussion 
has suggested, there is a good argument for making insider trad-
ing liability a mere default liability for at least some alternative 
entities that are not publicly traded: those alternative entities 
with the most sophisticated investors who choose the form pre-
cisely because of the resulting governance flexibility. State-
based liability not only allows states to tailor liability to state-
by-state differences in investor circumstances through their own 
definition of fiduciary duties, but also allows room for 
 
 252. See sources cited supra in notes 240–41 for the debate among scholars 
about federal and state roles. 
 253. See supra Part III.D. 
 254. It is surely also the case that public companies have comparatively un-
sophisticated owners who would benefit from mandatory fiduciary duties, which 
may provide one explanation for the continued endurance of corporations among 
public companies. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Reflections 
on the End of History for Corporate Law, in THE CONVERGENCE OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 44 n.9 (Abdul A. Rasheed & Toru Yoshikawa eds., 2012) (“Only a 
madman, it seems, would allow a business partner to contract out of the duty of 
good faith. We suspect [uncorporate entities’] extraordinary latitude to sidestep 
fiduciary obligations is meant to appeal to sophisticated and heavily lawyered 
agreements creating closely-held entities, and for this reason do not require 
standard form structures or fiduciary duties.”). 
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informative experimentation across states.255 A mixture of fed-
erally imposed liability for public companies and state-defined 
liability for the rest therefore could provide an improved sce-
nario.256 
Before addressing the issue of when liability should apply 
and whether that application should be mandatory for all, I 
briefly consider the scope of the fiduciary duty to be imposed. 
2. Scope of the Duty 
The scope of the duty, and when it arises, is an issue about 
which reasonable minds can differ. If, as many have argued,257 
as a policy matter insider trading liability would be best concep-
tualized as protecting investments by the firm in information, 
then the duty should be tailored around this property rights goal. 
In that case, the duty should encompass a disclosure-specific fi-
duciary duty to refrain from using nonpublic information belong-
ing to the firm for the insider’s advantage,258 rather than looking 
to the more traditional broader fiduciary duties of loyalty and 
care, which encompass far more than protecting property. This 
approach probably makes the most sense for any federally im-
posed fiduciary duty, as it does intrude minimally on the con-
tours of fiduciary duties that are traditionally defined through 
state law. 
 
 255. Several papers have recently suggested pursuing the general informa-
tional value from experimental legal regimes. See, e.g., Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, An 
Options Approach to Agency Rulemaking, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 881, 938–39 (2013); 
Zachary J. Gubler, Experimental Rules, 55 B.C. L. REV. 129, 136–39 (2014); Pe-
ter Molk & Arden Rowell, Reregulation and the Regulatory Timeline, 101 IOWA 
L. REV. 1497, 1525–30 (2016). 
 256. It would, however, perhaps be the most difficult to implement, requir-
ing both federal and state action. However, since the states already indirectly 
have defined when insider trading liability applies through their existing duty 
of loyalty caselaw, the primary new action would have to be only from the fed-
eral side. And, if states acted on their own to introduce liability for public com-
panies, federal action would not be required. If states wish to maintain their 
traditional jurisdiction over fiduciary duty law, it would be in their interest to 
take this action voluntarily. Roe, supra note 250, at 599–600 (identifying how 
states may feel pressure to regulate to save federal regulation from interven-
ing). 
 257. See supra Part III.G.  
 258. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Regulating Insider Trading in the 
Post-Fiduciary Duty Era: Equal Access or Property Rights?, in RESEARCH HAND-
BOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 80 (Stephen M. Bainbridge ed., 2013); Bainbridge, 
supra note 20, at 1267; Easterbrook, supra note 183, at 320–23. 
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Instead, we might want to move insider trading law in an 
entirely new direction, as some have argued.259 In that case, the 
fiduciary duty could be designed to alter more fundamentally the 
way insider trading liability attaches. If, for example, we wished 
to embrace the goal of equal access to information, the fiduciary 
duty could be crafted to require disclosure whenever a core in-
sider trades in company stock, regardless of whether the insider 
does so to profit at the company’s expense. These more funda-
mental shifts would then best be applied not just to alternative 
entities, but also traditional partnerships and corporations. 
Finally, a policymaker might be more interested in crafting 
a fiduciary duty that attempts to replicate existing case law. This 
fiduciary duty is often (but not always) viewed as a species of the 
duty of loyalty to the insider’s company and investors that re-
sults in an obligation to disclose private information or refrain 
from trading.260 In that case, all that must be done is to extend 
state law duties of loyalty, on a mandatory basis, to those uncor-
porate entities upon which we would impose insider trading lia-
bility. This approach likely makes the most sense for any state-
based expansion of insider trading liability, since states already 
define the scope of the duty of loyalty. Moreover, as I have argued 
elsewhere, there are compelling policy reasons to impose a man-
datory duty of loyalty on alternative entities in many contexts 
beyond the benefits of imposing insider trading liability;261 in-
sider trading liability provides an additional bonus. 
Finally, I turn to a consideration of which alternative enti-
ties—some, or all—should face this expansion in fiduciary duties 
and thereby face mandatory insider trading liability. 
3. Applying the Duty 
The final issue is whether insider trading liability should be 
a default form of liability for at least some alternative entities, 
or rather mandatory for all. There are policy arguments for mak-
ing insider trading liability mandatory, at least for some alter-
native entities. The earlier discussion revealed how some ad-
vantages from restricting insider trading accrue to the capital 
markets as a whole, such as those aimed at increasing trust in 
capital markets and the integrity of the mandatory disclosure 
 
 259. For a discussion of the potential solutions others have put forth, see 
supra note 219. 
 260. See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. 
 261. Peter Molk, Protecting LLC Owners While Preserving LLC Flexibility, 
51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2129, 2148–49 (2018). 
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system.262 Mandatory insider trading liability would correct for 
externalities that would otherwise result when firms choose 
their own rules. Other insider trading justifications that are tra-
ditionally fully internalized by the firm, such as the protection 
of investors or confidential information, might also justify man-
datory rules if investors cannot be relied upon to protect them-
selves.263 
But mandatory liability is not costless, as Part III demon-
strated. Restrictions sacrifice insider trading’s ability to publi-
cize negative information that would otherwise never become 
public.264 Restrictions also impose litigation expenses and dis-
traction costs when insider trading liability is litigated; these 
costs may outweigh any benefits.265 Since many of the benefits 
from regulated insider trading accrue exclusively to the firm and 
its shareholders, allowing those firms and shareholders to set 
their own rule may most often produce the efficient solution.266 
From a policy perspective, then, it may make sense to ex-
empt some uncorporate entities from mandatory liability. Ini-
tially, it may seem strange to even consider a default but non-
mandatory form of insider trading liability. In the partnership 
and corporate context, federal insider trading prohibitions are 
assumed to be mandatory.267 Moreover, the Exchange Act con-
tains an anti-waiver provision, noting that “[a]ny condition, stip-
ulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance 
with any provision of [the Act] or of any rule or regulation there-
under, or of any rule of a self-regulatory organization, shall be 
void.”268 The anti-waiver provision might plausibly be seen as 
preventing waiver of insider trading liability, which is imposed 
 
 262. See supra Parts III.D, F. 
 263. See supra Part III.A. 
 264. See supra Part III.I.1. 
 265. See supra Part III.I.3. 
 266. Fox et al., supra note 189, at 856 (“[A]n argument can be made that 
each issuer should be able to adopt a policy publicly allowing its insiders to trade 
as long as the policy is publicly announced.”) Fox, Glosten, and Rauterberg ul-
timately conclude that insider trading restrictions should be mandatory for all 
firms, in part because of the economies of scale from enforcement. Yet, unless 
subjecting more firms to insider trading prohibitions and oversight reduced ag-
gregate enforcement costs (rather than enforcement costs per firm), social wel-
fare could be improved by allowing firms to opt out of the prohibition when doing 
so benefits the firm. Id. at 856–59. 
 267. See, e.g., ROMANO, supra note 234, at 91. 
 268. Securities Exchange Act § 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2018). 
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through the Exchange Act’s Section 10(b). How could mere de-
fault liability then be possible? 
It turns out that even beyond insider trading in alternative 
entities, the conventional wisdom of mandatory insider trading 
restrictions already fails in practice. There are at least three dis-
tinct areas where parties engage in private ordering of insider 
trading restrictions. First, the misappropriation theory of in-
sider trading liability is, at least theoretically, subject to the pri-
vate control of the trader. Unlike the classical theory of insider 
trading focused on earlier, the misappropriation theory imposes 
liability when traders “misappropriate[] confidential infor-
mation for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed 
to the source of the information.”269 Yet this liability would not 
apply, according to the Supreme Court, “if the fiduciary discloses 
to the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic infor-
mation,” as there would no longer be deception required for in-
sider trading fraud liability.270 Traders facing liability under the 
misappropriation theory can therefore tailor liability by deciding 
whether to disclose their intentions to trade prior to making the 
trade.271 In other words, they can avoid the consequences of 
“mandatory” insider trading prohibitions through their own pri-
vate efforts, making the misappropriation theory essentially a 
default form of insider trading liability, not a mandatory one.272 
Second, the SEC’s Rule 10b5-2 establishes enumerated sit-
uations where a “duty of trust and confidence” arises, whose 
breach gives rise to misappropriation theory liability. But 
whether these situations are triggered is also, to some degree, 
within the control of traders, making this insider trading liabil-
ity also a default liability. The first case arises “[w]henever a 
person agrees to maintain information in confidence” and agrees 
not to trade on that information.273 To avoid liability here, the 
recipient of information need merely refrain from promising to 
 
 269. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). 
 270. Id. at 655. 
 271. Bainbridge, supra note 234 at 1633–34 (using the phrase “brazen mis-
appropriator” to describe this situation). In SEC v. Rocklage, the First Circuit 
held that this technique applied, if at all, only when the misappropriator has 
acquired the information legitimately, rather than through additional decep-
tion. 470 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 272. Gubler, supra note 67, at 1253 (“[T]he misappropriation theory gives 
rise to an insider trading prohibition that is in reality a type of default rule, 
allowing the source of the information and the trader to contract around the 
prohibition.”). 
 273. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1) (2018). 
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keep it in confidence or refrain from promising not to trade; to 
trigger liability, the recipient can merely agree to keep it confi-
dential and not trade.274 Mark Cuban’s unsuccessful prosecution 
by the SEC provides a vivid example of how parties can tailor 
“mandatory” insider trading liability in this way.275 The second 
enumerated case arises when people who share information 
“have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, such 
as the recipient of the information knows or reasonably should 
know that the person communicating the material nonpublic in-
formation expects that the recipient will maintain its confiden-
tiality.”276 Again, parties have the ability to adjust “mandatory” 
insider trading liability based on whether the provider of infor-
mation makes clear that the information is not provided in con-
fidence. Rule 10b5-2’s last enumerated case arises when family 
members share information, but it too can be adjusted based on 
whether there was an “agreement or understanding to maintain 
the confidentiality of the information.”277 
The final way that private parties already tailor “manda-
tory” insider trading liability is through the use of “big boy let-
ters.” Big boy letters are agreements between buyers and sellers 
of securities that stipulate the parties are sophisticated; that the 
parties may have private information about the securities that 
are to be traded; that the parties are not relying upon each 
other’s nondisclosure of that information; and that the parties 
waive the right to sue one another for that nondisclosure, in es-
sence, that they are “big boys” who can protect themselves.278 Big 
boy letters are an attempt by private parties to determine, 
through their own private means, whether they will face insider 
 
 274. Of course, if the provider of information breaches a duty to the infor-
mation’s source by passing information not in confidence, the recipient may in-
herit tippee liability through the Dirks framework discussed earlier. But if the 
provider is an insider who owes no fiduciary duties, we are back to the problem 
of seemingly no liability for the tippee to inherit. 
 275. SEC v. Cuban, No. 3:08-CV-2050-D (N.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2013). 
 276. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(2) (2018). 
 277. Id. § 240.10b5-2(b)(3). 
 278. For a helpful analysis of big boy letters, see Edwin D. Eshmoili, Note, 
Big Boy Letters: Trading on Inside Information, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 133, 135 
(2008). There is some question about whether big boy letters are directly en-
forceable between private parties because of Section 29(a)’s anti-waiver provi-
sion, but the letters might still eliminate any claim to reasonable reliance that 
the trader might otherwise have, which is a necessary component of establish-
ing a private insider trading action. Id. at 136–37, 153–56; see also Harborview 
Master Fund, LP v. Lightpath Tech., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 537, 547 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
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trading liability for a specific transaction. The lack of private 
suits regarding big boy letters suggests some success at achiev-
ing this objective.279 
Therefore, at least in some circumstances, insider trading 
liability is already merely a default liability, subject to the pri-
vate tailoring of parties. Applying default liability to some alter-
native entities, and mandatory liability to others, is therefore 
not such a foreign concept as might initially appear.  
Still, policymakers might instead favor a simpler solution 
that merely imposes mandatory insider trading liability on exec-
utives across all alternative entities, mimicking traditional part-
nerships, corporations, and those uncorporate entities organized 
in jurisdictions with mandatory fiduciary duties.280 This is cer-
tainly a workable solution, and it may even be optimal if the 
market-wide externalities of authorized insider trading are 
large. 
On the other hand, mandatory liability for all uncorporate 
entities may be overly broad. In states like Delaware, alternative 
entities are undeniably different from general partnerships and 
corporations. They reflect a commitment to freedom of contract, 
with the assumption that sophisticated parties choose alterna-
tive entities precisely for that reason and know best how to struc-
ture their protections.281 Insider trading liability can be viewed 
 
 279. Eshmoili, supra note 278, at 137. The SEC, however, has not deter-
mined that big boy letters would prevent the SEC from pursuing insider trading 
liability. Id. at 136–37. 
 280. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
 281. See, e.g., Mohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and the End of Corporate 
Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465, 479 (2009) (“[N]oncorporate investors are more 
likely to be financially sophisticated and more likely to seek legal advice in con-
nection with their investment.” (citations omitted)); Larry E. Ribstein, The 
Evolving Partnership, 26 J. CORP. L. 819, 848 (2001) (“LLCs . . . are usually 
[formed] with the advice of counsel.”); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of 
Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 197, 206 
(Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) (“[T]he parties [to LLCs] are more 
likely to be fully informed and sophisticated.”); Steele, supra note 14, at 237 
(“[I]t is important to note that sophisticated parties bargain for the obligations 
and duties provided in an LLC agreement. The choice of the LLC form was an 
intentional form, chosen by sophisticated parties because that form provides the 
contracting parties with the maximum ability to customize their relationship.”); 
Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited 
Partnership and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2007) 
(“Absent evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed that passive investors 
who authorize, in the unincorporated business entities’ enabling documents, the 
elimination or restriction of one or more fiduciary duties are fully informed of 
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as just one particular example of these protections that should 
be subject to sophisticated parties’ individual tailoring. If we 
could reliably identify these companies with sophisticated own-
ers, which might also be the companies least subject to generat-
ing negative market-wide externalities from authorized insider 
trading, then mandatory liability for those companies would be 
inappropriate. 
Therefore, another solution would be to impose mandatory 
insider trading liability on alternative entities without exclu-
sively sophisticated investors, but not on other alternative enti-
ties. When all owners are sophisticated, insider trading liability 
would apply merely by default,282 subject to waiver by the parties 
in their governance agreements.283 Mandatory regulation is 
 
the risks and benefits.”); Myron T. Steele, The Moral Underpinnings of Dela-
ware’s Modern Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 3, 22 (2012) (“[C]orporations and alternative business entities are differ-
ent. By law, at least in Delaware, members of alternative business entities have 
significantly more contractual power to define their relationships with their 
managers. . . . Consequently, in my view, members of alternative business enti-
ties can negotiate for precisely those protections that they want and ignore those 
that they do not want.”); see also Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition LLC, 
891 A.2d 1032, 1063 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“In the alternative entity context, . . . it is 
more likely that sophisticated parties have carefully negotiated the operating 
agreement.”). 
 282. Given the significant consequences that might result from contracting 
around this default, it would likely be wise to make the default fairly sticky, 
with a fairly conspicuous attempt needed to contract around it. LLC and LP 
agreements currently are able to contract out of default fiduciary duties without 
much transparency, varying the language in dense pages of micetype or, per-
haps most egregiously, specifying that the parties’ protections are limited solely 
to those within the agreement and then merely refraining from specifying fidu-
ciary duty protections within the agreement. See, e.g., Huatuco v. Satellite 
Healthcare, C.A. No. 8465, 2013 WL 6460898, *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2013) (limit-
ing rights to those in the governance agreement that stated, “Except as other-
wise required by applicable law, the Members shall only have the power to ex-
ercise any and all rights expressly granted to the Members pursuant to the 
terms of this Agreement”); Strine & Laster, supra note 119, at 13 (“[A]lternative 
entity agreements typically contain ninety-plus pages of dense, complex, and 
heavily cross-referenced legalese . . .”). Therefore, insider trading might be al-
lowed if, for example, the governance agreement explicitly authorized insider 
trading, but not if the agreement merely waived all fiduciary duties without 
highlighting the effects this waiver would have on insider trading liability. 
 283. Some might wonder how this default liability regime could exist along-
side the Securities Exchange Act’s prohibition against liability waivers. Securi-
ties Exchange Act § 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2018). As Judge Easterbrook 
noted, without the existence of a fiduciary duty, there is no liability to waive, so 
the doctrinal argument could be simply that the parties were waiving the 
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least compelling when owners are sophisticated. First, these par-
ties are the ones most capable of protecting themselves; rules 
that protect them from management opportunism are therefore 
less necessary. Second, these parties seem least subject to the 
negative externalities that might otherwise result from insider 
trading. Mandatory insider trading restrictions, for example, 
have been justified by promoting trust in the capital markets 
that reduces overall capital costs.284 But sophisticated parties 
are most likely to understand the implications from authorizing 
insider trading and are the least likely to exit the capital mar-
kets after experiencing an insider trading event, rendering their 
trust in the capital markets little affected by insider trading.285 
Similarly, insider trading restrictions might increase the speed 
of voluntary company disclosures,286 but sophisticated owners 
are the ones most likely to require speedy disclosure already or 
otherwise have access to it.  
The challenge, of course, is to identify those investors who 
are “sophisticated” and who potentially might have only default 
insider trading liability protection. This is a challenge that I 
have dealt with extensively elsewhere in the alternative entity 
context, so I merely summarize it here.287 The difficulty lies in 
identifying, at fairly low cost, those investors who are likely to 
recognize and price the consequences from authorized insider 
trading into their investment decision. Investors who price gov-
ernance provisions are the ones most likely to authorize insider 
trading only when doing so benefits the company as a whole, 
 
fiduciary duty. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(“Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act . . . forbids waivers of the provi-
sions of the Act. . . . But a provision must be applicable to be ‘waived,’ and the 
existence of a requirement to speak is a condition of the application of § 10(b) to 
a person’s silence during a securities trade. The obligation to break silence is 
itself based on state law, and so may be redefined to the extent state law per-
mits.”).  
 284. See supra Part III.F. 
 285. Perhaps, however, there might be spillover effects: ordinary investors 
might lose trust in capital markets because they know that some companies, in 
which they cannot invest, authorize insider trading. Policy choices elsewhere 
suggest this concern is small: offerings exempt under Rule 506 provide just one 
example. See infra notes 291–92 and accompanying text for discussion. 
 286. See supra Part III.C. 
 287. This is a challenge that I have dealt with extensively elsewhere, when 
considering how to apply corporate-like protections (including fiduciary duties) 
to alternative entities. Molk, supra note 261, at 1259–68. The basics of the ex-
ercise are similar, although the particular application and conclusions are 
slightly different. 
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maximizing the value from mere default liability. These inves-
tors also protect against the potential opportunism and mispric-
ing of capital that might otherwise occur when investors assume 
they have one set of protections, only to realize later they have 
another, weaker set.288  
This requirement yields several possibilities. We might look 
to the uncorporate entity’s state of formation, assuming that par-
ties investing in non-domestic companies are comparatively so-
phisticated.289 We might require investors to pass financial  
sophistication tests before allowing them to invest in “risky” 
companies with mere default insider trading liability.290  
Perhaps the most workable solution, however, would be to 
look to financial measures, as does securities law’s accredited in-
vestor framework.291 This framework uses investors’ wealth and 
income as a proxy for the sophistication needed to price unregis-
tered investments and shoulder the consequences of a failed 
risky venture.292 There is significant overlap between the desir-
able characteristics of an insider trading separation tool and the 
characteristics that the accredited investor framework is de-
signed to identify; both effectively identify investors who can 
price governance protections, or at least would not be too turned 
off by a failed risky venture to have negative spillover effects in 
the market. Of course, a wealth-based sorting mechanism is far 
from a perfect means of distinguishing investors who meet the 
substantive standard, but it has at least some predictive power, 
and it is easy to administer.  
Any sorting mechanism, whether wealth-based or other-
wise, and whether state-law or federal, should make sure that 
publicly traded alternative entities face mandatory insider trad-
ing restrictions. Doing so is worthwhile at least to preserve the 
integrity of the periodic disclosure system.293 Moreover, the in-
vestor base of publicly traded companies may only poorly protect 
itself by monitoring management, and insider trading in publicly 
traded companies may be most likely to produce negative spillo-
vers of mispriced capital and higher capital costs from investor 
 
 288. Id. at 2133. 
 289. Id. at 2165–66. With LLCs’ and LPs’ growing acceptance by more tra-
ditional investors focused merely on limited liability and not the concomitant 
governance flexibility, this proxy has become increasingly noisy over time. 
 290. Id. at 2159–68. 
 291. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2018). 
 292. Molk, supra note 261, at 2156. 
 293. See supra Part III.D. 
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distrust.294 If a wealth measure were chosen as a proxy for so-
phistication, this outcome is already ensured. Since publicly 
traded entities (whether corporations or alternative entities) will 
have many low-wealth investors, those companies will fail the 
investor sophistication screen, and insider trading liability will 
be mandatory for them.  
The preceding discussion therefore reveals two paths. One 
path would impose a mandatory insider trading restriction on all 
alternative entities. This approach, while potentially overinclu-
sive, is justified by a need for either uniform standards or for 
aggressive protection against negative externalities from core 
executive insider trading. The other path would impose manda-
tory insider trading liability on alternative entities with inves-
tors unlikely to protect themselves, and mere default liability on 
the rest. This approach, assuming uncorporate entities could be 
accurately sorted without much difficulty, could allow for more 
optimal governance agreements without significant costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Insider trading law and its reliance on fiduciary duties has 
functioned reasonably well for decades, with case law patching 
holes in liability as those holes develop. This system that rests 
on fiduciary duties for liability now has yet another problem: 
new types of alternative entities that waive any fiduciary duties 
among managers, investors, and the firms under state law. Pol-
icy arguments show that at least some alternative entities 
should be subject to the same liability as corporations and gen-
eral partnerships. However, these new organizational forms’ 
dedication to contractual flexibility suggests value from making 
insider trading liability merely a default for some alternative en-
tities. It is time for the law of insider trading to respond with a 
careful consideration of when and how to extend insider trading 




 294. See supra Parts III.C, F. 
